The Internet is a Semicommons by Grimmelmann, James
GRIMMELMANN_10_04_29_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/29/2010 11:26 PM 
 
2799 
THE INTERNET IS A SEMICOMMONS 
James Grimmelmann* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As my contribution to this Symposium on David Post’s In Search of 
Jefferson’s Moose1 and Jonathan Zittrain’s The Future of the Internet,2  I’d 
like to take up a question with which both books are obsessed:  what makes 
the Internet work?  Post’s answer is that the Internet is uniquely 
Jeffersonian; it embodies a civic ideal of bottom-up democracy3 and an 
intellectual ideal of generous curiosity.4  Zittrain’s answer is that the 
Internet is uniquely generative; it enables its users to experiment with new 
uses and then share their innovations with each other.5  Both books tell a 
story about how the combination of individual freedom and a cooperative 
ethos have driven the Internet’s astonishing growth. 
In that spirit, I’d like to suggest a third reason that the Internet works:  it 
gets the property boundaries right.  Specifically, I see the Internet as a 
particularly striking example of what property theorist Henry Smith has 
named a semicommons.6  It mixes private property in individual computers 
and network links with a commons in the communications that flow 
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 1. DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE:  NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE (2009). 
 2. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
 3. See POST, supra note 1, at 116 (“How do you build a democratic system that would 
scale, that would get stronger as it got bigger, and bigger as it got stronger? . . . But like the 
American West of 1787, cyberspace is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian kind of 
place.”). 
 4. See id. at 202 (“The perfect Jeffersonian world, then, is one that has as much 
protection for speech as it can have, but only as much protection for intellectual property as 
it needs.  Sounds like cyberspace!”). 
 5. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 71–74 (defining and analyzing generativity); id. at 
149 (“This book has explained how the Internet’s generative characteristics primed it for 
extraordinary success . . . .”). 
 6. See generally Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the 
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000) (introducing semicommons concept). 
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through the network.7  Both private and common uses are essential.  
Without the private aspects, the Internet would collapse from overuse and 
abuse; without the common ones, it would be pointlessly barren.  But the 
two together are magical; their combination makes the Internet hum. 
Semicommons theory also tells us, however, that we should expect 
difficult tensions between these two very different ways of managing 
resources.8  Because private control and open-to-all-comers common access 
necessarily coexist on the Internet, it has had to develop distinctive 
institutions to make them play nicely together.  These institutions include 
the technical features and community norms that play central roles in Post’s 
and Zittrain’s books:  everything from the layered architecture of the 
Internet’s protocols9 to Wikipedia editors’ efforts to model good behavior.10  
As I’ll argue, the dynamic interplay between private and common isn’t just 
responsible for the Internet’s success; it also explains some enduring 
tensions in Internet law, reveals the critical importance of some of the 
Internet’s design decisions, and provides a fresh perspective on the themes 
of freedom and collaboration that Post and Zittrain explore. 
Here’s how I’ll proceed:  In Part II of this essay, I’ll set up the problem.  
Part II.A will use Post’s and Zittrain’s books to describe two critical facts 
about the Internet—it’s designed and used in ways that require substantial 
sharing and openness, and it’s sublimely gigantic.  Part II.B will explain 
why this openness is problematic for traditional property theory, which sees 
resources held in common as inherently wasteful.  Part II.C will explain 
how commons theory can make sense of commonly held resources, but 
only at the price of introducing a new problem:  an internal tension about 
the scale at which these resources should be held.  The theory of tangible 
common-pool resources tells a tragic story that emphasizes the need to keep 
the group of those with access to the commons small.  But the theory of 
peer-produced intellectual property tells a happier tale, one that emphasizes 
the importance of massive collaboration—of openness to as many people as 
possible. 
In Part III, I’ll resolve this tension between pressures for smallness and 
pressures for bigness by showing how a semicommons can accommodate 
both.  Part III.A will introduce Henry Smith’s theory of the semicommons, 
which he illustrates with the example of fields open to common grazing for 
sheep but held in private for farming.  Part III.B will explain how treating 
the Internet as a semicommons elegantly transforms the small-and-private 
 
 7. Id. at 131. 
 8. See Smith, supra note 6, at 145 (“[T]he open-field system is a mixture of common 
and private ownership, and the question is, why not one or the other?”); infra Part III. 
 9. See POST, supra note 1, at 80–86 (discussing layering); ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 
67–69 (“Layers facilitate polyarchies . . . .”); infra Part IV.A. 
 10. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 142–43, 147–48 (discussing “netizenship” and 
“personal commitments” of Wikipedia editors); infra Part IV.B. See generally ANDREW 
DALBY, THE WORLD AND WIKIPEDIA:  HOW WE ARE EDITING REALITY (2009) (describing the 
history and norms of Wikipedia in detail). 
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versus large-and-common antithesis into a compelling synthesis.  
Simultaneously treating network elements as private property and the 
“network” as a commons captures the distinctive benefits of both resource 
models.  And in Part III.C I’ll briefly describe how semicommons theory is 
implicit in Zittrain’s argument. 
In Part IV, I’ll demonstrate the analytical power of this way of looking at 
the Internet—in particular, how it makes sense out of a wide range of 
technical and social institutions commonly seen online.  Part IV.A will 
illustrate the importance of layering in enabling uses of the Internet at 
different scales to coexist.  Part IV.B will discuss how user-generated 
content (UGC) sites solve semicommons governance problems.  And Part 
IV.C will consider the role of boundary-setting in the failure of Usenet and 
the success of e-mail.  Finally, in Part V, I’ll briefly argue that 
semicommons theory usefully helps us focus on the interdependence 
between private and common, rather than seeing them as implacable 
opposites. 
II.  PROPERTY AND THE PROBLEM OF SCALE 
David Post and Jonathan Zittrain both link the Internet’s extraordinary 
growth to its extraordinary openness.  You don’t need to ask anyone’s 
official permission to create a new community or a new application online.  
Result:  more freedom and more innovation, enabling the Internet to 
outcompete proprietary, controlled networks.11 
But this openness, which draws on property-theoretic ideas about 
sustainable commons, comes with its own theoretical puzzle.  Big things 
have a tendency to collapse under their own weight, and the Internet is 
nothing if not big.12  The conventional wisdom in property circles is that a 
commons in any finite resource becomes increasingly untenable as its scale 
increases.13  The intellectual “commons” that many intellectual property 
scholars celebrate escapes this trap because (and only because) information 
isn’t used up when it’s shared.14  That tells us why writers and musicians 
and inventors and programmers can benefit from robust sharing and a rich 
public domain, but it doesn’t seem to be directly relevant to the underlying 
question of why the Internet didn’t flame out spectacularly several orders of 
magnitude ago, as users took advantage of its openness to use up its 
available capacity. 
This part will articulate, in somewhat more detail, the nature of this 
theoretical tension between openness and size on the Internet.  Part II.A will 
 
 11. See POST, supra note 1, at 103 (“Perhaps it was a coincidence that the network that 
became ‘the Internet’ was the one that operated this way . . . .  I doubt it, though.”); 
ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 30 (“The bundled proprietary model . . . had been defeated by the 
Internet model . . . .”). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
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discuss the problem of scale, using Post’s musings on Jefferson as the point 
of departure.  Part II.B will tell what I call the “Tragic” story within 
commons theory—that a commons can be a sustainable alternative to 
private property or direct regulation, but only for small-scale resources.  
Part II.C will tell a different story, which I call the “Comedic” one:  that for 
nonrival information goods, where exhaustion isn’t an issue, unrestricted 
sharing can have benefits far outweighing costs. 
A.  On Being the Right Size (for an Internet) 
In Search of Jefferson’s Moose takes its title, its cover art, and its central 
metaphor from the stuffed moose that Thomas Jefferson proudly displayed 
in Paris in 1787.15  Jefferson was serving as the United States’ official 
representative in France, and he saw himself as a cultural and intellectual 
ambassador, not just a political one.  The French naturalist George Buffon 
had written that New World animals were smaller than their Old World 
counterparts, owing to the defectively cold and wet American climate.16  
While Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia attempted to refute this 
analysis with facts and figures, the moose offered a more demonstrative 
proof that American species could stand tall with the best that Europe had 
to offer.17 
In Post’s telling, the political subtext is hard to miss.  Jefferson’s moose 
was big, standing seven feet tall; it was novel, existing only on the North 
American continent;18 and it was robust, an example of the rude good 
health of North American wildlife.19  It was, in short, a metaphor for the 
newly formed United States, another product of North America.  
Contemporary political theory considered large republics inherently 
unstable, and the United States was the largest republic in human history.20  
Jefferson’s moose was meant to “dazzle” his visitors into what Post calls an 
“‘Aha!’ moment” of belief—that creatures of its size could thrive in the 
New World, and so could the equally large American republic.21 
Jefferson’s metaphor for the United States thus becomes Post’s metaphor 
for the Internet.  He’s looking for a way to dazzle his readers into their own 
 
 15. POST, supra note 1, at 16–18. 
 16. Id. at 63–64. 
 17. See id. at 63–68 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 
(Frank Shuffelton ed., Penguin Books 1999) (1785)). 
 18. Or so Jefferson thought when he referred to the moose as a “species not existing in 
Europe.”  He was wrong; Alces alces also thrives in Scandinavia and Russia. See VICTOR 
VAN BALLENBERGHE, IN THE COMPANY OF MOOSE 1 (2004) (“Simply put, moose are giant 
deer that live in the northern forests of Europe, Asia, and North America.”). See generally 
LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, MR. JEFFERSON AND THE GIANT MOOSE:  NATURAL HISTORY IN EARLY 
AMERICA 81–100 (2009) (describing Jefferson’s search for a moose specimen and his not-
always-reliable research methods). 
 19. POST, supra note 1, at 63–68. 
 20. See id. at 110–16. 
 21. Id. at 209. 
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“Aha!” moments about it.  Post wants his readers to believe that it really is 
there, that it really is something new, and that it really does work.  Just as 
Jefferson’s moose was meant to impress visitors with its scale, the first half 
of Jefferson’s Moose is meant to impress readers with the Internet’s scale. 
This point bears emphasis.  The Internet is sublimely large; in 
comparison with it, all other human activity is small.  It has more than a 
billion users,22 who’ve created over two hundred million websites23 with 
more than a trillion different URLs,24 and send over a hundred billion e-
mails a day.25  American Internet users consumed about ten exabytes of 
video and text in 2008—that’s 10,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes, give or 
take a few.26  Watching all the videos uploaded to YouTube alone in a 
single day would be a full-time job—for fifteen years.27  The numbers are 
incomprehensibly big, and so is the Internet.28 
These statistics tell us beyond peradventure that the Internet has been 
wildly successful, but they don’t by themselves tell us why.  Post’s answer 
is that the Internet is built in a uniquely Jeffersonian way.  Technologically, 
it depends on bottom-up, self-organized routing.29  Its political and social 
structures, as well, are self-organized in a bottom-up fashion, with decisions 
made by local groups on the basis of consensus and voluntary association.30  
These features are also characteristic of Jefferson’s ideal democratic 
republic, making the Internet the truest realization yet of his political 
vision.31  People choose to go to the Internet for the same reasons Jefferson 
 
 22. See Press Release, comScore, Inc., Global Internet Audience Surpasses One Billion 
Visitors, According to comScore (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/
Press_Releases/2009/1/Global_Internet_Audience_1_Billion/%28language%29/eng-US. 
 23. Netcraft, December 2009 Web Server Survey, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/
2009/12/24/december_2009_web_server_survey.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); see also 
The VeriSign Domain Report, DOMAIN NAME INDUSTRY BRIEF (VeriSign, Mountain View, 
Cal.), Dec. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.verisign.com/domain-name-services/domain-
information-center/domain-name-resources/domain-name-report-dec09.pdf (over 187 
million registered domains). 
 24. See Posting of Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj to Official Google Blog, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html (July 25, 2008, 10:12 
PDT). 
 25. CISCO SYS., INC., CISCO 2008 ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/securityreview12-2.pdf. 
 26. ROGER E. BOHN & JAMES E. SHORT, HOW MUCH INFORMATION?  2009:  REPORT ON 
AMERICAN CONSUMERS app. B, at 32 (2009), available at http://hmi.ucsd.edu/pdf/
HMI_2009_ConsumerReport_Dec9_2009.pdf. 
 27. See YouTube, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (reporting twenty hours of video uploaded per minute).  My 
calculation assumes a forty-hour workweek.  If you didn’t stop to sleep or eat, you could 
watch a day’s worth of YouTube videos in only three years and a few months. 
 28. Cf. James Grimmelmann, Information Policy for the Library of Babel, 3 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 29, 38–40 (2008) (comparing the Internet to Borges’s infinite Library of Babel). 
 29. See POST, supra note 1, at 80–99. 
 30. See id. at 126–41. 
 31. See id. at 107–17. 
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expected them to settle the American West:  to build new lives and new 
communities for themselves on a firm foundation of liberty.32 
Zittrain’s theory of the Internet’s success is that it’s a generative system, 
open to unfiltered contributions from anyone and everyone.33  The Internet 
lets its users innovate and share their innovations with each other without 
being thwarted by gatekeepers who can veto proposed changes and system 
designers who can make change impossible in the first place.34  This greater 
openness to unanticipated developments gives the Internet a powerful 
flexibility:  it can draw on the best of what all its users have come up 
with.35  Like Post’s, this is a bottom-up story:  these new protocols, 
technologies, and communities are being assembled by individuals, rather 
than being dictated from on high. 
Property theory has a word for this form of resource management:  
commons.  Post focuses on the self-assembly inherent in the Internet 
Protocol (IP)36 and on self-governance,37 while Zittrain focuses on 
technical innovation38 and norm creation,39 but these are very much the 
same story.  The Internet’s users are individually empowered to use the 
network as they see fit.  There’s no Internet Tycoon who owns the whole 
thing and can kick everyone else off; there’s no Internet Czar who sets the 
rules for everyone else.  That makes the Internet, on this view, a nearly 
ideal commons:  a resource that everyone has a privilege to use and no one 
has a right to control. 
So far, so good.  But there’s a reason that Post calls it the “problem” of 
scale.40  Size is more than just proof of success; it also creates new and 
distinctive problems of its own.  The biological metaphor is helpful.  
Following Haldane’s classic On Being the Right Size, Post writes, “Large 
organisms are not and cannot be simply small organisms blown up to larger 
size.”41  A moose blown up by a factor of ten, to be seventy feet tall instead 
 
 32. See id. at 116–17, 172–78 (discussing Jefferson’s vision of the settlement of the 
American West). 
 33. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 19–35; see also Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative 
Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006). 
 34. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 80–90. 
 35. See id. at 31 (discussing “procrastination principle” of deferring decisions by leaving 
architecture open initially); cf. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Architecture of 
Participation:  Does Code Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open Source 
Development Model?, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1116 (2006) (discussing importance of “option values” 
in open source software projects). 
 36. POST, supra note 1, at 73–99. 
 37. Id. at 133–41, 178–86. 
 38. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 80–90. 
 39. Id. at 90–96, 134–35, 141–48, 223–25. 
 40. See, e.g., POST, supra note 1, at 60 (titling one chapter, “Jefferson’s Moose and the 
Problem of Scale I”). 
 41. Id. at 61.  Haldane’s essay itself links biological and political scale, concluding with 
a passage on the maximum size of a democratic state (increasing with technological change) 
and the impossibility of socialist governance of truly large states. J.B.S. Haldane, On Being 
the Right Size, 152 HARPER’S MAG. 424, 427 (1926) (“I find it no easier to picture a 
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of seven, would have one thousand times the body mass but only one 
hundred times the bone cross section.  It would quite literally collapse under 
its own weight. 
The same is true of computer networks:  some architectures that work 
well with one hundred users fail embarrassingly with one million—or one 
billion.  Post gives another back-of-the-envelope demonstration to show 
that a centrally operated Internet could not possibly have a strong enough 
skeleton42 to support all of the communications between its billion-plus 
users.43  Thus, the decentralization and ad hoc ethos that Post and Zittrain 
celebrate about the Internet are technological necessities.  It took packet 
switching and distributed best-efforts routing to make a global network on 
the scale of the Internet feasible. 
Property theory has its own problem of scale.  If Buffon thought that 
nature made large New World wildlife impossible, and if political theorists 
thought human nature made large republics impossible, and if network 
engineers thought that physics made large decentralized networks 
impossible, then property theorists have long thought that large commons 
were self-defeating.44  Anything held in common would be overused or 
underproduced, and the larger the relevant community, the more severe the 
problem.45  As the Internet asymptotically approaches the whole of human 
experience, it would seem that its usability ought to be trending toward a 
limit of zero.  The benefits of openness are clear, but so are the immense 
costs of wasteful and self-interested overuse.  Since the Internet, like 
Jefferson’s moose or the aerodynamically unlikely bumblebee that Zittrain 
uses as a metaphor for Wikipedia,46 unarguably is, this success requires 
explanation.  To find one, we will need to delve deeper into property 
theory. 
 
completely socialized British Empire or United States than an elephant turning somersaults 
or a hippopotamus jumping a hedge.”).  Had Haldane been exposed to the Internet, he might 
have noted that it has an inordinate fondness for pictures of cats. 
 42. The major networks that carry the heaviest volumes of Internet traffic are referred to 
as “backbones.” See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 158.  Note the use of the plural. 
 43. See POST, supra note 1, at 68–79. 
 44. The intuition, as Henry Smith notes, goes back to Aristotle. See Henry E. Smith, 
Governing Water:  The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 451 
n.25 (2008) (citing ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 33 (Stephen 
Everson ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1996)). 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 148 (“Wikipedia is the canonical bee that flies despite 
scientists’ skepticism that the aerodynamics add up.” (citing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH 
OF NETWORKS:  HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 76–80 
(2006))).  In his conclusion, Post applies his own biological metaphor to Wikipedia, writing 
that Wikipedia might well be “a pretty good moose, something we could bring with us . . . to 
show to people of the Old World.” POST, supra note 1, at 209. 
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B.  The Tragedy of the (Rival) Commons 
In order to make sense of the Internet as a species of commons, we first 
need to situate the commons within property theory.  Our starting point is 
the standard distinction between two kinds of resources:  private goods and 
pure public goods.47 
Private goods such as cars, farms, and handbags have two key 
characteristics.  First, they’re rival:  one person’s use of the good makes it 
unavailable for someone else.  Only one person at a time can carry a 
handbag or plant the same furrow.  Second, they’re excludable:  it’s 
possible to prevent people from using the good.  We can hold tightly to 
handbags and put fences around farms.  These distinctions are illustrated in 
the following, wholly conventional figure: 
 Rival Nonrival 
Excludable Private Toll 
Nonexcludable Common Public 
For rival goods, excludability has three salutary effects.  First, it helps 
prevent wasteful underuse.  If you own a resource but my proposed use is 
higher value than yours, it will be profitable for both of us for you to sell it 
to me.48  Second, it prevents dissipation of the resource’s value as we fight 
over it; without excludability I could simply take the resource from you and 
you could take it back, ad nauseam.  Third, it promotes efficient investment:  
companies will invest in creating or improving resources if they can also 
reap the gains from the increase in value.49 
Things are trickier when excludability fails.  Resources that are rival but 
not excludable are common goods (in the bottom-left quadrant of the 
diagram).  Common goods are subject to a wasteful race that Garrett Hardin 
termed the “tragedy of the commons” in his influential 1968 article.50  As 
he argued, 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd.  And another; and another. . . . But this is the 
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
 
 47. See generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, 
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8–13 (1986); Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, 
Artifacts, and Facilities:  Information as a Common-Pool Resource, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 111, 119–21. 
 48. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
354–55 (1967).  Excludability, by making it possible to “own” a resource, thus makes it 
possible to transact over it. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the 
Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64–67 (1970). 
 49. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Public Production of Private Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 
293, 293–94 (1970) (giving example involving slaughterhouse that supplies both meat and 
leather). 
 50. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited.  
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.  
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.51 
The tragedy flows from the lack of excludability.  The herdsmen race to 
graze more sheep because no one can stop them, and they know that no one 
will stop the others.  If excludability could be restored and the sheep could 
somehow be kept off the pasture, the race would be terminated before it got 
out of hand.52  As Hardin put it, “the necessity of abandoning the 
commons”53 would require “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”54 to 
establish effective restrictions on overuse. 
Hardin assumed that these restrictions could take one of two forms:  
“private property” or governmental “allocation.”55  A sole private owner 
absorbs the full costs and benefits of using the pasture and therefore will 
choose the right number of sheep to graze.56  A government regulator, on 
the other hand, could allow multiple shepherds access, but limit the number 
of sheep each may graze so that the total comes out right.  Either way, the 
key is to recreate excludability.57  On our diagram, these are moves from 
the bottom-left quadrant to the top-left. 
Henry Smith has generalized this dichotomy by recasting it as a division 
between two organizational forms:  exclusion and governance.58  Exclusion, 
which corresponds to private property, involves giving one designated 
gatekeeper complete control over the resource.59  In a governance regime, 
on the other hand, multiple users are allowed to use the resource, but are 
subject to rules specifying how, when, and in what ways.60  An exclusion 
regime puts a fence around the pasture and gives one person the key; a 
governance regime brands all the sheep and limits the number each person 
may graze.  The exclusion/governance distinction focuses on the 
 
 51. Id. at 1244 (omission in original). 
 52. Others had made a similar observation about another scarce natural resource that 
functioned as a commons:  fisheries. See Peder Anderson, “On Rent of Fishing Grounds”:  
A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 Article, with an Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. ECON. 
391 (1983); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:  The 
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); see also Cheung, supra note 48. 
 53. Hardin, supra note 50, at 1248. 
 54. Id. at 1247. 
 55. Id. at 1245. 
 56. See Demsetz, supra note 48, at 355. 
 57. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 47, at 43; Hardin, supra note 50, at 1247 
(“Consider bank-robbing.  The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank were a 
commons.  How do we prevent such action?” (emphasis added)). 
 58. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454–55 (2002). 
 59. Id. at S454. 
 60. Id. at S455. 
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institutional characteristics that matter, rather than on the formal label of 
“property” or “regulation.” 
Exclusion and governance both depend on a source of authority to 
enforce the rules that recreate excludability.  To use Hardin’s term, 
“coercion” was essential.61  But, as scholars of the commons have 
recognized, that coercion need not come from above, in the form of the 
state.62  It could also come from below, from the other users of the resource 
themselves. 
Elinor Ostrom’s work shows that many communities have successfully 
managed common resources.63  Her list of successes includes Spanish 
irrigation ditches, Japanese forests, and even Swiss grazing meadows—
Hardin’s signature example of failure, turned on its head.  These 
communities have created and then enforced on themselves a governance 
regime controlling use of their common resource.  These bottom-up 
institutions are neither archaic holdovers nor illusory bulwarks; under the 
right circumstances, common ownership can thrive for hundreds of years. 
It doesn’t always work, though.  Many common ownership regimes have 
succeeded, but many others have failed.64  The question thus becomes, what 
distinguishes the commons that work from the ones that suffer Hardin’s 
tragic fate?  Ostrom and others give lists of the core factors that make a 
commons sustainable, including good institutions to gather information 
about the resource, forums to discuss its management, graduated sanctions 
to punish misusers, and community participation in making and enforcing 
the rules.65 
In this tradition, one factor stands out as essential to the success of a 
commons:  community coherence.  Mancur Olson’s theory of collective 
action argues that small groups can better coordinate their actions than large 
ones.66  Ostrom emphasizes the importance of well-defined boundaries, not 
just around the resource, but around the community too.67  Robert 
Ellickson’s study of Shasta County ranchers found their norm-based self-
regulation worked because they formed a “close-knit group.”68  These 
communities can transform a commons into a common-pool resource:69  
they supplement their internal governance regime with exclusion towards 
 
 61. Hardin, supra note 50, at 1247. 
 62. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 13–15 (1990). 
 63. Id. at 51–88. 
 64. See id. at 143–78 (discussing “institutional failures and fragilities”). 
 65. See id. at 88–102. 
 66. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 22–36 (1971). 
 67. See OSTROM, supra note 62, at 91–92. 
 68. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
15–40, 177–82 (1991). 
 69. See Hess & Ostrom, supra note 47, at 120. 
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outsiders.70  Only a small, well-defined, tightly knit group can recognize 
outsiders to keep them away, monitor and act against its own members with 
the necessary intensity, and have a sufficiently strong incentive to bother. 
Size, in other words, ought to be fatal to commons self-management.  All 
else being equal, a small and coherent community is more likely to succeed 
at running a commons; a large and diffuse one is more likely to botch the 
job.  The bigger the group, the greater the tendency towards ruin. 
Let’s call this strain of commons theory the Tragic story.  Its basic lesson 
is Hardin’s:  commonly held resources are vulnerable to self-interested 
overuse.  That fate can be staved off through a variety of arrangements, 
including private property, governmental regulation, or common self-
management.  This last institutional form requires community members to 
craft their own rules of appropriate use, monitor each other’s behavior, and 
punish violators.71  This is a fragile enterprise; only strong and well-defined 
communities will be able to sustain the constant work of self-control 
required.  Success requires closing the commons off to outsiders; to throw 
the community open to them is to court disaster. 
This Tragic story has been frequently told about the Internet.  
Telecommunications analysts predict an impending bandwidth crunch, as 
users deplete the limited supply of available connectivity.72  
Telecommunications companies complain that selfish bandwidth hogs are 
destroying the Internet experience for other customers.73  Scholars warn 
that weak incentives to cooperate make Wikipedia unsustainable74—or 
perhaps online sharing more generally is doomed.75  The Tragic story 
 
 70. This arrangement is also described in the literature as a “limited-access commons,” 
see, e.g., Smith, supra note 58, at S458, or “limited common property,” see, e.g., Carol M. 
Rose, The Several Futures of Property:  Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades 
and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132 (1998). 
 71. OSTROM, supra note 62, at 42–45, 92–100. 
 72. See, e.g., BROADBAND WORKING GROUP, MASS. INST. OF TECH. COMMC’N FUTURES 
PROGRAM, THE BROADBAND INCENTIVE PROBLEM 2 (2005), available at http://cfp.mit.edu/
docs/incentive-wp-sept2005.pdf (“The broadband value chain is headed for a train 
wreck. . . . The broadband locomotive left the station with a critical missing piece:  the 
incentive for network operators to support many of the bandwidth-intensive innovations 
planned by upstream industries and users.”); Bret Swanson, The Coming Exaflood, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 20, 2007, at A11 (“Today’s networks are not remotely prepared to handle this 
exaflood.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Kim Hart, Shutting Down Big Downloaders, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2007, at 
A1 (“Comcast has punished some transgressors by cutting off their Internet service, arguing 
that excessive downloaders hog Internet capacity and slow down the network for other 
customers.”). 
 74. See Eric Goldman, Wikipedia’s Labor Squeeze and Its Consequences, 8 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 157, 159–61 & n.12 (2010). 
 75. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1493–504 
(2007) (reviewing BENKLER, supra note 46) (“Taken together, these challenges are daunting, 
and they might push social production to the peripheries of the new economy.”). 
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explains skepticism about YouTube’s business model76 and fears about the 
rise of malware, botnets, and denial-of-service attacks.77 
If, as the Tragic story predicts, bigger means riskier, then the immense 
Internet ought to be an immense smoking ruin.  Peer-to-peer file sharing 
and video downloads always look poised to overwhelm capacity in a host of 
I-want-mine overuse.  Just as soon as a few more people crank up their 
usage, or one really clever bad apple figures out how to use it all up, it’ll be 
the endgame for the Internet.  As of this writing though, the Internet still 
stands, the Tragic story notwithstanding.  To make sense of why that might 
be, let’s return to commons theory—another strand of which has come to 
almost exactly the opposite conclusion. 
C.  The Comedy of the (Nonrival) Commons 
So far, we’ve been discussing rival resources, in the left-hand column of 
the diagram.  Here, to repeat, the traditional economic view is that 
efficiency flows from excludability; commons theory accepts that view but 
offers a different, bottom-up way of creating exclusivity. 
Now, let’s turn to the right-hand column, where nonrival resources dwell.  
Once again, traditional economic theory prizes excludability, albeit with 
considerably less certitude than for rival resources.  But this time, commons 
theory takes an altogether more radical turn—arguing that exclusivity itself 
is overrated. 
The starting point of the analysis is that many nonrival goods can be 
shared with others for much less than it costs to make them in the first 
place.  Information in digital form, for example, can be copied and 
transmitted around the world for almost nothing.  But even tangible goods 
can often be shared without imposing costs on current users:  at 2:00 a.m., a 
second car on the road doesn’t limit the first driver’s ability to use the 
highway, too.78 
 
 76. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Do You Think Bandwidth Grows on Trees?, SLATE, Apr. 
14, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216162/ (“YouTube has to pay for a gargantuan Internet 
connection to send videos to your computer and the millions of others who are demanding 
the most recent Dramatic Chipmunk mash-up. . . . [N]ot even Google can long sustain a 
company that’s losing close to half a billion dollars a year.”). 
 77. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 43–54 (describing the “untenable” state of 
online security). 
 78. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 945–46 (2005).  To be more precise, as Brett 
Frischmann explains, goods vary in their capacity to accommodate multiple uses.  But even a 
good with a finite capacity can still be effectively nonrivalrous if that capacity is also 
renewable. Id. at 950–56.  A stretch of highway may be able to accommodate 2000 cars per 
hour, but its use at 6:00 a.m. has essentially no effect on its ability to accommodate cars at 
6:00 p.m.  As long as we’re beneath the level of use at which adding cars would create a 
traffic jam now, the highway is nonrival.  Yochai Benkler has developed this point into a 
theory of “sharable” goods. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely:  On Shareable Goods and 
the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 330–
44 (2004). 
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Where the nonrival resource is also nonexcludable, and thus a pure 
public good, this is a problem.  As soon as the seller has created the good—
say, a photograph of a sheep—everyone else can have access to it for free; 
only suckers and patsies would pay for it if they didn’t have to.  But that 
leaves the photographer with no economic incentive to go out and spend 
days taking the perfect photograph, so she won’t create it in the first place, 
which leaves no original for others to copy.  Result:  everyone loses.79 
The conventional response here has been to focus on making the resource 
more excludable.80  This is the usual economic apology for granting a 
photographer copyright over her photographs, for example.81  It allows her 
to prevent the nonrival sharing that would otherwise flood the market with 
cheap copies and undercut her ability to recoup her costs.82  The same logic 
also explains various self-help substitutes for intellectual property, such as 
end-user license agreements and digital rights management (DRM):  they 
all recreate excludability.83  If she can move all the way up the right-hand 
column and make the resource perfectly excludable, then she can capture 
the full social value of her work, giving her an efficient incentive for the 
optimal level of creativity.84  In this respect, at least, full excludability 
makes public nonrival goods look like private rival goods.85 
But excludability’s prevention of free riding is not a free lunch.  For one 
thing, it’s expensive to establish:  IP laws have to be enforced, licenses have 
to be drafted, and DRM has to be programmed.86  For another, excludability 
can be harmful in itself.  Even though the good (being nonrival) could be 
shared freely or cheaply, a rational owner will instead price it to maximize 
her profits.  But that means she’ll sell it for more than some people would 
 
 79. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 19–21 (2003). 
 80. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” (emphasis added)). 
 81. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 79, at 112–13. 
 82. See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
217, 221–28. 
 83. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1119–20 (2007). 
 84. See Demsetz, supra note 49, at 300–03 (arguing that the resulting equilibrium 
“allocates resources efficiently to the production of the public good”). 
 85. There are, however, other important ways in which they differ.  Because these 
nonrival goods have high fixed (or first-copy) costs but very low marginal costs, there’s an 
enormous competitive advantage to being the bigger competitor in a market.  Your average 
costs will be lower than your competitors, helping you undercut their prices and seize the 
whole of the market.  This gives these markets—one kind of “network industry”—distinctive 
economics and creates special managerial and regulatory challenges. See generally CARL 
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:  A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK 
ECONOMY (1999); OZ SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES (2001).  The 
semicommons analysis developed in this essay may have implications for these industries. 
 86. It also has other unfortunate side effects:  it cripples otherwise useful devices and 
smothers innovation. See Wendy Seltzer, The Imperfect Is the Enemy of the Good:  
Anticircumvention Versus Open Development, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2010). 
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have been willing to pay;87 the good ends up being used less than would 
have been socially efficient.88  Thus, the conventional economic narrative 
of intellectual property law is of a dialectic pitting her ex ante incentives to 
create the information good against the ex post value of broad access to it.89  
Whatever balance we choose is likely to impose costs on both sides. 
Scholars have therefore looked for ways to avoid the difficulties of 
finding market incentives to create public goods.  One approach is right 
there in the name:  the government could directly invest in these “public” 
goods.  That’s the conventional way of paying for physical public goods, 
like lighthouses.90  At times, governmental investment has also been used to 
pay for information goods, such as the NEA’s grants to artists and prizes for 
scientific discoveries.91  Once government funding succeeds in bringing 
these goods into existence, they can be given away freely.  Voilà:  no costs 
from imposing excludability.92 
Commons theory takes this idea—maximal circulation of information 
goods at no cost—and runs with it.  The key move is the recognition that 
solving the ex post distribution problem can also, paradoxically, help solve 
the ex ante production problem.93  Making information more widely 
available doesn’t just benefit passive couch-potato information consumers; 
 
 87. In a world in which she cannot price discriminate perfectly and costlessly, that is.  If 
she could, perfect price discrimination would also in theory lead to an efficient outcome, one 
in which she appropriates all the value of the good, rather than other users. See James Boyle, 
Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?  Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual 
Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2021–35 (2000) (discussing “Econo-World” view of price 
discrimination).  But that world isn’t our world, and, in ours, price discrimination is costly 
and imperfect, leaving us to argue over second bests. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, An 
Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 
2072 (2000). 
 88. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99–100 (1997). 
 89. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Forseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1577–79 (2009). 
 90. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 360–62 (1974) 
(discussing British lighthouse system, maintained by Trinity House, a governmental body). 
But see id. at 363–72 (discussing history of private lighthouses in Britain). 
 91. See, e.g., MASHA GESSEN, PERFECT RIGOR:  A GENIUS AND THE MATHEMATICAL 
BREAKTHROUGH OF THE CENTURY, at vii–xi (2009) (predicting that the $1,000,000 prize for 
proof of Poincaré Conjecture is likely to be refused by mathematician who proved it); DAVA 
SOBEL, LONGITUDE:  THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO SOLVED THE GREATEST 
SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME 16 (2006) (describing the £20,000 prize offered in 1714 for 
discovery of an accurate method of determining longitude while at sea). 
 92. On the other hand, having the government pay for it doesn’t solve the problem of 
deciding how much to pay for it.  Here, it’s even more difficult to decide how much the 
government should spend for the sheep photograph.  Since the photograph will ultimately be 
given away for free, the government will find it well-nigh impossible to learn how much 
each individual would have been willing to pay for it. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure 
Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388–89 (1954). 
 93. See Frischmann, supra note 78, at 946–59. 
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it also helps other information producers.94  Information goods are critical 
inputs into the production of other information goods, so increasing their 
circulation gives creators more to work with. 
Information is the oxygen of the mind; lowering the cost of air lets minds 
breathe more freely.95  All creativity is influenced and inspired by what has 
come before; all innovation incrementally builds on past inventions.  The 
public domain is not simply a negative space of the unprotected, but a 
positive resource of immense richness available to all.96  On this account, 
reducing the excludability of nonrival information goods will often lead to 
more information production, not less, because the reduced incentives for 
creators will be more than outweighed by the increased access to raw 
materials.97 
In a further twist, scholars of the information commons have argued that 
often we don’t need any external incentives for the production of 
information goods.98  In these cases, we can dispense with excludability 
completely.  Some people take photographs of sheep because they want the 
pictures for themselves; others want to express a vision of pastoral serenity; 
still others want to hone their skills with a camera, or to show off those 
skills to potential employers.  This diversity of motivations means that even 
though the vast majority of photographers in the world are unpaid, they’re 
still enthusiastically snapping pictures.  Steven Weber’s studies of open 
source software and Yochai Benkler’s theory of peer production emphasize 
that personal expression, generosity, reciprocity, desire to show off, and 
other purely social motivations can be just as strong as economic ones.99 
 
 94. Indeed, one of the other virtues of commons theory is its willingness to recognize 
that “consumers” and “producers” are often the exact same people, that individuals move 
between these roles seamlessly in their cultural, social, and intellectual lives. See, e.g., Jack 
M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of Freedom of Expression for 
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) (“Freedom of speech . . . is 
interactive because speech is about speakers and listeners, who in turn become speakers 
themselves. . . . [I]ndividual speech acts are part of a larger, continuous circulation.”).  The 
idea, however, has led to some unfortunate portmanteaus. See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & 
ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS:  HOW MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 
124–27 (2008) (“prosumer”); Erez Reuveni, Authorship in the Age of the Conducer, 54 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 285, 286–87 (2007) (“conducer”). 
 95. Cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, 
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to 
others, free as the air to common use.”). 
 96. See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND (2008). 
 97. See Frischmann, supra note 78, at 990–1003 (arguing that this claim is likely to hold 
for certain kinds of infrastructural information). 
 98. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369, 423–36 (2002). 
 99. See BENKLER, supra note 46, at 59–90; STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN 
SOURCE (2004). 
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When they think about the ideal scale of an information commons, these 
thinkers generally say, “the more the merrier.”100  There are network effects 
from increased participation; the more people who are sharing with you, the 
greater the riches available for you to draw on.  They don’t cost you 
anything; indeed they may actively help out your own creative processes, 
for example by pointing out bugs in your open-source software.101  If the 
community is engaged in cooking up a batch of informational stone soup, 
the larger the community grows, the richer the soup becomes, and the less 
of a burden the cooking places on any individual member.102  Moreover, as 
Benkler argues, increased community scale leads to more opportunities for 
productive collaboration, so that sharing catalyzes creativity and vice-versa, 
accelerating the virtuous circle.103 
Let’s call this strain of commons theory the “Comedic” story.104  It 
applies to nonrival resources, and particularly to information goods.  To 
review, its basic argument is that repudiating excludability is often better 
than embracing it.  Since the resources are nonrival, free riding poses no 
threat of waste.  Instead, a commons ensures the maximum possible use of 
valuable information, avoiding the waste associated with exclusive rights.  
The incentives to produce and share come from the internal and social 
motivations of participants, motivations that under the right circumstances 
may even be supplied by the commons itself. 
Like its doppelgänger, the Comedic story has also frequently been told 
about the Internet.105  The blogosphere, built on an ethos of sharing one’s 
own thoughts and linking to others’, is numerically dominated by 
noncommercial blogs written for personal reasons; even bloggers who make 
money selling ads still give the actual words away.106  The last half-decade 
on the Web has been the great era of UGC sites like YouTube, Flickr, 
Facebook, and Twitter—all of which offer users access to content uploaded, 
for unpaid sharing, by other users.  Sharing makes the Web go round.107  
 
 100. The phrase comes from Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Custom, 
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986). 
 101. See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR:  MUSINGS ON LINUX AND 
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 33–36 (2001). 
 102. Eric Raymond gives the metaphor of a “magic cauldron” that produces soup ex 
nihilo, then argues that open source software is that cauldron made real. See id. at 115. 
 103. BENKLER, supra note 46; Benkler, supra note 98, at 415 (“[T]here are increasing 
returns to the scale of the pool of individuals, resources, and projects to which they can be 
applied.”). 
 104. The inspiration for this term comes from Carol Rose’s remarkable Comedy of the 
Commons, supra note 100.  
 105. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 98, at 404–05. 
 106. See SCOTT ROSENBERG, SAY EVERYTHING:  HOW BLOGGING BEGAN, WHAT IT’S 
BECOMING, AND WHY IT MATTERS 163–97 (2009). 
 107. Cf. Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant:  Free Software and the Death of 
Copyright, FIRST MONDAY, Aug. 2, 1999, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/684/594 (“So Moglen’s Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday’s Law 
says that if you wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the planet, 
software flows in the network.  It’s an emergent property of connected human minds that 
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There’s also a strong argument that many of these sharing-based sites are 
successfully outcompeting their more restricted competitors.  Wikipedia’s 
outrageous success, as compared with Nupedia, Citizendium, Knol, 
Encarta, and every other would-be online encyclopedia, could reasonably 
be attributed to its extraordinary openness to unfiltered contributions from 
anyone.108 
And on a deeper level, one noted by both Post109 and Zittrain,110 the 
Internet is itself largely built with nonproprietary technical standards, free 
for anyone to reuse and implement for themselves.111  Even when private 
companies develop and commercialize services, they’ve thrived best when 
the companies have released well-documented public interfaces, free for 
anyone to use and build upon in making new mashup applications.112  Even 
much of the software on which the Internet itself runs is the freely shared 
product of collaborative open-source development, carried out 
collaboratively worldwide . . . on the Internet.113 
III.  THE SEMICOMMONS 
It should by now be clear that the Tragic and Comedic stories point in 
diametrically opposite directions.  The Tragic story embraces exclusion; it 
tells us that the only way to make a commons work is to make it small and 
jealously keep outsiders out.114  The Comedic story rejects exclusion; it 
tells us that the best way to make a commons thrive is to make it large and 
invite in as many participants as possible.115  As applied to the immensity 
of the Internet, the Comedic story predicts utopia and the Tragic story 
predicts utter devastation. 
The Internet’s success at scale suggests that there must be something to 
the Comedic story’s optimism, but so far, we have no good theoretical 
 
they create things for one another’s pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too 
alone.”). 
 108. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 133 (closure of Nupedia); Randall Stross, 
Encyclopedic Knowledge, Then vs. Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at BU3 (end of Encarta); 
On Wikipedia, On Citizendium, http://onwikipedia.blogspot.com/2010/01/on-
citizendium.html (Jan. 18, 2010, 16:06) (“stagnat[ion]” of Citizendium); Erick Schonfeld, 
Poor Google Knol Has Gone from a Wikipedia Killer to a Craigslist Wannabe, 
TECHCRUNCH, Aug. 11, 2009, http://techcrunch.com/2009/08/11/poor-google-knol-has-
gone-from-a-wikipedia-killer-to-a-craigslist-wannabe/ (decline of Knol). 
 109. POST, supra note 1, at 133–41. 
 110. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 141. 
 111. These same standards were in many cases developed in open participatory processes, 
where all-important decisions were made on a consensus basis. See MILTON L. MUELLER, 
RULING THE ROOT:  INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 89–94 (2002). 
 112. See Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0, O’REILLY, Sept. 30, 2005, http://oreilly.com/
web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html; cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 181–85 (discussing “API 
neutrality”). 
 113. See generally GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF LINUX AND THE 
OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (2001). 
 114. See supra Part II.B. 
 115. See supra Part II.C. 
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reason to pick one or the other.  The Tragic story seems perfectly plausible 
as a description of the sad fate awaiting all of the shared and all-too-
exhaustible aspects of the Internet:  bandwidth, server space, processor 
cycles, and human attention.  The Comedic story seems equally plausible as 
a description of the great achievements that result from instant, inexpensive, 
worldwide sharing of inexhaustible information.  Our task for this part will 
be to reconcile the two. 
A.  The Open-Field Semicommons 
I’d like to suggest that the right abstraction is Henry Smith’s theory of a 
semicommons: 
In a semicommons, a resource is owned and used in common for one 
major purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual 
economic units—individuals, families, or firms—have property rights to 
separate pieces of the commons.  Most property mixes elements of 
common and private ownership, but one or the other dominates. . . . In 
what I am calling a semicommons, both common and private uses are 
important and impact significantly on each other.116 
On Smith’s account, a resource must satisfy two conditions to be a good 
candidate for semicommons ownership.  There must be multiple possible 
uses of the resource that are efficient at different scales, so that one use is 
naturally private, and one is naturally common.  These uses must also have 
significant positive interactions with each other, so that there will be a 
benefit from allowing both rather than choosing one.  The combination of 
scale mismatch and positive interactions offers rewards for mixing private 
and common.117 
Smith’s “archetypal example of a semicommons is the open-field system 
of medieval [Europe].”118  Sheep could be grazed freely across the fields of 
a village during fallow seasons, but during growing seasons, individual 
farmers had exclusive rights to their strips of land.  The same fields were 
held in common for grazing and privately for farming:  a semicommons.  
As he shows, the open-field system displayed both scale mismatch and 
positive interactions.119 
First, the two valuable uses of its land—grazing sheep and raising 
crops—were efficient at different scales.  Medieval grazing had scale 
economies:  one shepherd could watch a large flock on a correspondingly 
large pasture.120  Medieval farming was a labor-intensive, small-scale 
affair.  Each farmer could plow, seed, tend, and harvest only a limited 
 
 116. Smith, supra note 6, at 131–32. 
 117. See id. at 168. 
 118. Id. at 132.  Yes, sheep and pastures again.  Hardin’s tragic commons and Ostrom’s 
potentially sustainable one are the same as Smith’s semicommons, just theorized differently. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 135–36. 
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quantity of land.  Nor was there much benefit in teaming up; two men 
couldn’t plow the same furrow, and combining holdings would have 
tempted each farmer to shoulder less than his share of the work.121 
Thus, grazing made sense as a commons in which each villager was 
entitled to contribute sheep to a large flock grazed across large tracts of 
land.  This is a natural governance regime:  the extent of each villager’s use 
could easily be monitored by counting his sheep.  On the other hand, 
farming made sense as private property in which each villager farmed his 
own small plot of land.  This is a natural exclusion regime:  it’s easy to tell 
who’s harvesting from which piece of land.122 
As for positive interactions, the same land could profitably be used for 
both farming and grazing.  Land needs to sit fallow between growing 
seasons;123 a village might as well graze sheep during the off-season.124  
Better still, the best source of fertilizer for the fields was the manure left 
behind by the sheep.125  Thus, the private plots of land worked better for 
their private purpose because they were also open to the common use of 
grazing sheep. 
In addition to explaining why a semicommons might come into being, 
Smith’s theory also explains some of the distinctive threats it will face from 
strategic behavior.126  I’d like to emphasize three.  First, in a semicommons, 
users will be tempted not just to overuse the common resource, but to 
strategically dump the costs onto others’ private portions, bearing none of 
the costs themselves.127  On a rainy day, when trampling hooves will do the 
most damage and create the most mud, a shepherd might be tempted to 
direct the herd onto someone else’s plot of land and well away from his 
own.128  Second, users may be tempted to take expensive and socially 
wasteful precautions to guard against others’ strategic uses—say, sitting 
outside all day in the rain to watch the shepherd.129  And third, private users 
will be tempted to disregard the commons use in pursuit of their private 
gain;130 imagine a farmer who decides to plant a profitable crop that’s 
poisonous to sheep.  The semicommons only makes sense if the benefits 
from combining the private and common uses outweigh the costs from 
these kinds of strategic behavior.131 
Semicommons also have important strategies for dealing with these 
challenges.  One is sharing rules, in which some of the private portions of 
 
 121. See id. at 136–38. 
 122. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327–30 (1993). 
 123. And sometimes during them, as required by crop rotation. 
 124. Smith, supra note 6, at 132, 135. 
 125. Id. at 136. 
 126. Id. at 138–41. 
 127. Id. at 138–39. 
 128. Id. at 149. 
 129. Id. at 140–41. 
 130. Id. at 141. 
 131. Id. at 141–42. 
GRIMMELMANN_10_04_29_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/29/2010  11:26 PM 
2818 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
the resource are collected and divided among the various users.132  Smith 
gives the example of general average in admiralty, in which all those with 
an interest in a ship or its cargo must contribute proportionately to 
reimburse anyone whose property is damaged in the course of avoiding a 
common peril.133  That eliminates the captain’s temptation to throw other 
people’s cargo overboard first.  In our hypothetical village, pooling some of 
the crops after each season would be a sharing rule protecting victims of 
excessive trampling. 
Another characteristic semicommons device is boundary-setting.134  
Smith’s example here is scattering; each villager’s landholdings were 
divided into multiple small strips in different fields, rather than one larger 
plot.135  Scattering was costly; farmers sometimes got confused about 
which strip was theirs.136  But it also made abusive herding less attractive.  
With many thin strips, it’s harder for the shepherd to park the sheep over his 
own plot while they poop, and over someone else’s plot while they stomp.  
Getting the property boundaries right thus helps prevent strategic behavior. 
B.  The Internet Semicommons 
Smith’s semicommons model accurately describes the Internet.  We’ll 
see every element of it online:  private and common uses of the same 
resource, efficient at wildly different scales, but productively intertwined; 
strategic behavior that also causes these uses to undermine each other;137 
sharing rules and boundary-setting to keep the whole thing functioning.138  
The productive but fraught interplay between private and common uses in a 
semicommons elegantly captures the tension between the Tragic and 
Comedic stories on the Internet. 
Let’s start with the private and common uses.  On the one hand, the 
computers and network cables that actually make up the Internet are private 
personal property, managed via exclusion.  My laptop is mine and mine 
alone.  If I decide to laser-etch its case, or to wipe it clean and reinstall the 
operating system, no one can stop me.  Nor can anyone else decide what 
outlet it’s plugged into; if you try to treat it as common property and take it 
home with you, you’ll be brought up on charges.  The same goes for 
Rackspace’s servers139 and Level3’s fiber-optic network:140  private 
property, all of it. 
 
 132. Id. at 142 & n.27. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 161–67. 
 135. Id. at 146–54. 
 136. Id. at 147–48. 
 137. See infra Part IV.A. 
 138. See infra Part IV.C. 
 139. See Rackspace, Definitions and Technical Jargon of the Hosting Industry, 
http://www.rackspace.com/information/hosting101/definitions.php (last visited Apr. 10, 
2010) (“In a managed hosting environment, the provider owns the data centers, the network, 
the server and other devices, and is responsible for deploying, maintaining and monitoring 
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On the other hand, as a communications platform,141 the Internet is 
remarkably close to a commons, managed via governance in the form of 
technical standards and protocols.142  Fill out an IP datagram with the 32-bit 
IP address of a computer you’d like to send a message to, and dozens of 
routers will cheerfully cooperate to get it there.143  The destination 
computer has also likely been configured to collaborate with you.  Send it 
an HTTP GET message and you’ll get back a Web page;144 send it an 
SMTP HELO and it will get ready to accept an e-mail from you.145  With 
this kind of support—yours for the asking—you and your friends can set up 
a new website, a new online application, a new protocol, a new peer-to-peer 
network, a new whatever you want.  That’s common use of a fairly 
profound sort—precisely as Post and Zittrain describe.146 
Next, these private and common uses are efficient at different scales.  
Private property makes sense for individual computers and cables; the 
 
them. . . . Dedicated Hosting . . . allows customers to lease pre-configured, dedicated 
equipment and connectivity from the provider.”). 
 140. See Level3, Our Network, http://www.level3.com/index.cfm?pageID=242 (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (“The Level 3 Communications® Network today operates as one of 
the largest IP transit networks in North America and Europe.”). 
 141. To be clear, I’m focusing more on tangible communications platform as a common 
use, rather than the intangible information exchanged on it.  The nonrivalry of information 
and the Comedic story explain why the Internet is so valuable as a communications platform; 
they don’t actually make the Internet into information or eliminate the challenges of rivalry.  
We’ve faced the problem of exchanging nonrival information over rival communications 
infrastructure for a long time; the Internet is just better at the task than its predecessors. See 
generally Frischmann, supra note 78, at 1005–22 (describing the Internet as infrastructure).  
Robert Heverly has written an important and illuminating article on how intellectual property 
law makes information a semicommons of positively interacting private and common uses. 
Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2003); 
see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:  
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 271 (2007); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004) (describing Creative Commons as a “semicommons” in 
Heverly’s sense). 
 142. See generally LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS:  THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2009) (discussing governance role of Internet standards). 
 143. See 1 DOUGLAS COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP:  PRINCIPLES, PROTOCOLS, 
AND ARCHITECTURE (5th ed. 2006) (describing IP datagram format and routing); INFO. SCIS. 
INST., RFC 791, INTERNET PROTOCOL:  DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM PROTOCOL 
SPECIFICATION § 2.3 (1981), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791 (“The function or purpose of 
Internet Protocol is to move datagrams through an interconnected set of networks.  This is 
done by passing the datagrams from one internet module to another until the destination is 
reached.”). 
 144. See generally DAVID GOURLEY & BRIAN TOTTY, HTTP:  THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 
(2002) (describing HTTP standard). 
 145. See JOHN RHOTON, PROGRAMMER’S GUIDE TO INTERNET MAIL:  SMTP, POP, IMAP, 
AND LDAP (2000); JONATHAN B. POSTEL, RFC 821, SIMPLE MAIL TRANSFER PROTOCOL 
(1982), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc821 [hereinafter RFC 821] (detailing SMTP standard). 
 146. See POST, supra note 1, at 101–03; ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 26–35. 
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Tragic story warns us to restrict access.147  Computers are rival:  they can 
be stolen, hijacked, or crashed.  Hardware remains expensive enough that 
people will try to get their hands on it (physically or virtually), and when 
they succeed, it creates real costs for others.148  Private property empowers 
individual owners to protect against laptop thieves, virus writers, and botnet 
wranglers.149 
Moreover, private use of computers aligns incentives well.  Computers 
require their owners to invest time, effort, and money:  buying the 
hardware, setting up the software, keeping the power and bandwidth 
flowing.  An exclusion regime both allows and encourages computer 
owners to select the configuration that’s value-maximizing for them.  I use 
my laptop to write papers, check e-mail, and surf the Web wirelessly; you 
use your broadband-connected desktop to run regressions and play World 
of Warcraft.  Our ideal computers are profoundly different; asking us to 
play sysadmin for each other would only pile up the agency costs.  All of 
this pushes towards small-scale private ownership. 
On the other hand, commons use makes sense when we look at the 
Internet as a communications platform.  The Comedic story tells us that 
where information exchange is concerned, we should design for the widest 
participation possible.  A communications network’s value plummets if it’s 
fragmented.150  If you have something to say to even one other person, you 
may as well post it publicly, so that anyone else can take advantage of it.  
When you do, better to share with the world than with any smaller group.151 
Further, this large-scale communications platform wouldn’t work 
efficiently if it were private.  Scholars have noted the immense transaction 
 
 147. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289 
(2005) (applying semicommons theory to argue against the use of common property 
treatment of individual physical network elements). 
 148. See Joris Evers, Computer Crime Costs $67 Billion, FBI Says, CNET NEWS, Jan. 19, 
2006, http://news.cnet.com/Computer-crime-costs-67-billion,-FBI-says/2100-7349_3-
6028946.html. 
 149. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 159 (advocating “a simple dashboard that lets 
the users of PCs make quick judgments about the nature and quality of the code they are 
about to run”).  Such sentiments assume that users have the sort of autonomy over their PCs 
that a private property owner would, a principle Zittrain strongly endorses. See id. at 108–09. 
 150. See Andrew Odlyzko & Benjamin Tilly, A Refutation of Metcalfe’s Law and a 
Better Estimate for the Value of Networks and Network Interconnections 4 (Mar. 2, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/metcalfe.pdf 
(arguing that the value of an n-user network grows as n log n); see also Bob Briscoe et al., 
Metcalfe’s Law Is Wrong, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 2006, at 35 (later version of Odlyzko & 
Tilly article). 
 151. Lauren Gelman observes that users often post sensitive information in publicly 
accessible ways online.  Her point is that public accessibility allows you to reach others who 
share your interests, even when you couldn’t identify them at the time of the posting.  The 
value of reaching them can outweigh even significant privacy risks of being noticed by 
outsiders. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1334–35 (2009). 
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costs of negotiating individual permission from every system owner,152 
along with the potential anticommons holdup problems.153  It’s almost a 
mantra at this point that if you want to create a successful online service, 
you need to make it free and freely available.154  And even as ISPs threaten 
to introduce stringent usage caps, they can barely manage to tell customers 
how much bandwidth they’re actually using.155  The commons has a 
powerful hold on the Internet as communications platform. 
In other words, the Tragic story is right, for the individual computers and 
wires that constitute the Internet.  It recommends private property, which is 
indeed how these physical resources are held.  And the Comedic story is 
also right, for those computers and wires considered as the communications 
platform that is the Internet.  It recommends an unmanaged commons, 
which is indeed how this virtual resource is held. 
Not only are both stories right, they’re right at wildly different scales.  
Remember how there are over a billion users and over two hundred million 
websites on the Internet?156  That’s a difference of eight or nine orders of 
magnitude between the scale of the individual computers on which private 
owners operate and the scale of the worldwide common platform.  That 
divergence isn’t a one-time anomaly; it’s what the Internet does, every 
millisecond of every day, everywhere in the world. 
Satisfying Smith’s other condition, these two uses “impact . . . on each 
other”157 profoundly and positively.  You couldn’t build a common global 
network without the private infrastructure to run it on, but most of the value 
of that infrastructure comes from the common global network dancing atop 
it.  To see why it’s the interaction that adds the value, remember that the 
private owners could disconnect their computers from the semicommons at 
any moment—and choose not to.  Would you buy a computer incapable of 
being connected to the Internet?  Neither would I.  This is a semicommons 
that works.  Indeed, the Internet is probably the greatest, purest 
semicommons in history. 
 
 152. Paul Ohm has pointed out that in many cases, just trying to meter or monitor these 
information flows—a necessary step in privatizing them—would in many circumstances be 
ruinously costly. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1417. 
 153. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 500–14 (2003). 
 154. See Chris Anderson, Free!  Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business, WIRED, Mar. 2008, 
at 140. 
 155. See, e.g., Jesse Kirdahy-Scalia, One Year After Capping Bandwidth, Comcast Still 
Offers No Meter, OPEN MEDIA BOSTON, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.openmediaboston.org/
node/860. 
 156. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 157. Smith, supra note 6, at 132. 
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C.  The Generative Semicommons 
In a moment, we’ll complete this portrait of the Internet semicommons 
by looking at its characteristic forms of strategic behavior.  But first, I’d 
like to point out how semicommons theory offers a fresh perspective on 
generativity.  The Future of the Internet describes the generativity of both 
the personal computer (PC)158 and the Internet,159 which map neatly onto 
the private and common aspects of the Internet. 
A generative PC is one that its owner fully controls.  Not a tethered 
appliance that’s physically yours but practically under someone else’s 
governance.160  Not a cloud service that you might be excluded from 
tomorrow.161  And not an insecure box actually under the control of a 
shadowy Elbonian hacker syndicate.  No, the generative PC is your private 
property, yours to do with exactly as you choose. 
The generative Internet, on the other hand, is defined by its 
connectedness and commonality.  Once you have a great new hack, the best 
thing to do is to send it out to others, so they can replicate its benefits for 
themselves and build their own improvements on it.  That means the 
network ought to be as common as possible; you should be able to share 
your innovations with anyone, not subject to any third party’s veto.  
Although Zittrain rejects a “categorical” end-to-end principle,162 he 
treasures the way that the Internet’s lack of control permits a “flexible, 
robust platform for innovation.”163 
The two stages of generativity—creating and sharing—thus map onto 
private and common, respectively.  The cycle works best when the two are 
not just available, but conjoined.  Generativity is the story of the Internet as 
innovating semicommons. 
IV.  CHALLENGES 
As a semicommons, the Internet is valuable because it combines private 
and commons uses.  Merely saying that it does, however, gives little 
guidance on how to make this coexistence work.  Indeed, one of Smith’s 
central points is that problems of strategic behavior are actually worse in a 
semicommons than in a pure commons.164  His account of the open-field 
system doesn’t just explain why it might make sense to treat the village 
fields as a semicommons; it also describes how villagers were able to solve 
these strategic behavior problems.165  In so doing, he also provides a 
 
 158. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 11–18. 
 159. Id. at 19–35. 
 160. Id. at 101–04. 
 161. Jonathan Zittrain, Op-Ed., Lost in the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A19. 
 162. ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 165. 
 163. Zittrain, supra note 33, at 1990. 
 164. Smith, supra note 6, at 138–39. 
 165. See supra Part II.A. 
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potentially more satisfying explanation of one of the characteristic features 
of the open fields:  scattering.166 
This part will do the same for the Internet:  link the theoretical question 
of the mitigation of strategic behavior in a semicommons to well-known 
descriptive characteristics of the Internet.  I’ll argue that the success of 
many Internet technical features and online institutions can be cleanly 
explained in terms of their ability to overcome semicommons dilemmas.  
Part IV.A discusses “layering,” one of the Internet’s basic technical 
characteristics, in which one protocol provides a clean abstraction atop 
which another can run, and so on repeatedly.  Layering helps mediate the 
private/common interface and helps prevent these uses from interfering 
with each other.  Part IV.B takes up UGC sites, which exhibit a consistent 
correlation between a community and a particular piece of infrastructure.  
This linkage enables them to use governance rather than exclusion to detect 
and prevent misuse of their little corner of the Internet.  And Part IV.C 
looks at some problems of boundary-setting, in particular how the Usenet 
system of distributed bulletin boards has failed to cope with strategic 
behavior.  Its experience tells us much about the challenges of institution 
design on the Internet. 
A.  Layering 
The term “layering” comes from computer science, where it describes the 
division of a system into components, each of which only interacts with the 
ones immediately “above” or “below” it.167  Programmers and system 
designers use layered architectures because they enable modularity:  each 
component can be designed without needing to know how the others work, 
which reduces the complexity of the programming task and simplifies 
debugging by reducing interactions between components.168 
On the Internet, layering is prevalent.  When one user writes another an 
e-mail, the actual exchange typically involves six or more layers.  The e-
mail (“content” layer) is sent from one e-mail program to another 
(“application” layer) using the Simple Mail Transport Protocol (another 
application, but one operating at the service of e-mail programs), which 
uses the Transmission Control Protocol to open a stable connection from 
one computer to the other (“transport” layer).  That connection, in turn, is 
 
 166. Smith, supra note 6, at 146–54 (arguing that border-setting semicommons 
explanation of scattering is superior to other economic explanations). 
 167. See 1 W. RICHARD STEVENS, TCP/IP ILLUSTRATED:  THE PROTOCOLS 1–6 (1994); 
ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 26 (4th ed. 2003); TELECOMM. 
STANDARDIZATION SECTOR, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ITU–T RECOMMENDATION X.200, 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY—OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION—BASIC REFERENCE 
MODEL:  THE BASIC MODEL § 5.2, at 6–8 (1994), http://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?
lang=e&id=T-REC-X.200-199407-I!!PDF-E&type=items. 
 168. See STEVE MCCONNELL, CODE COMPLETE:  A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE 
CONSTRUCTION 94–108 (2d ed. 2004); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 
195–200 (3d ed. 1996). 
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made up of a sequence of discrete IP datagrams (“network” layer), which in 
turn are moved from one computer to the other using a network protocol 
such as Ethernet (“link” layer) that is tailored to run well on specific 
hardware like a Category 5e twisted-pair copper cable (“physical” layer).  
The e-mail program doesn’t need to know how Ethernet works, and vice-
versa.169 
For our purposes, one layer is more equal than the others:  the network 
layer, where IP is universal.170  Lower layers have a diversity of networking 
protocols and hardware; higher layers have a diversity of transports and 
applications.  But there is only one network-layer protocol worthy of note 
on the Internet:  IP.171  Everyone uses it.  The Internet itself can be defined 
as the global network of computers using IP to communicate with each 
other.172 
As legal scholars have recognized, layering has policy implications.173  
In particular, it permits different resource allocation regimes at different 
layers.  The same network may be fully private at the physical layer (only 
the company IT manager can enter the room with the server), a limited-
access common-pool resource at the link layer (only employees in the 
building can connect to it, but they can do so freely), a governed open-to-
the-world common-pool resource at the application layer (the company 
allows outside e-mail connections but filters them for spam), and mixed 
commons and private at the content layer (outside users send the employees 
both proprietary company documents and freely shared jokes).  These 
different regimes coexist:  the same physical network is simultaneously 
participating in all of them.174  Any given electrical signal is meaningful at 
multiple layers. 
 
 169. See TANENBAUM, supra note 167, at 37–71. 
 170. To be more precise, this claim would also include the ancillary routing protocols, 
such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Routing Information Protocol (RIP), 
that tell IP-implementing systems which other computers they should forward IP traffic 
through. See COMER, supra note 143, at 249–93 (describing BGP and RIP). 
 171. The current version of IP in broad use is version 4; there is a worldwide effort 
underway to upgrade to version 6.  But IP’s universality makes this upgrade both technically 
challenging and politically contentious:  any widely adopted change to IP will change the 
nature of the Internet itself. See DENARDIS, supra note 142, at 4; LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:  
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 207–09 (1999) (“[W]e again will have to decide whether 
this architecture of regulability is creating the cyberspace we want.  A choice.  A need to 
make a choice.”). 
 172. See James Grimmelmann & Paul Ohm, Dr. Generative—Or How I Learned To Stop 
Worrying and Love the iPhone, 69 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (book review). 
 173. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 23–25 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers 
Principle:  Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 818–20 (2004); 
Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
37, 57–60 (2002); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1163, 1188–93 (1999). 
 174. See Solum & Chung, supra note 173, at 838–44 (discussing coexistence of multiple 
layers). 
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IP plays a critical role in this system of overlapping regimes; it is the 
layer on which the Internet is most fully a commons.  Beneath are privately 
owned hardware, managed networks, and (sometimes) proprietary 
protocols.  Above it are specialized protocols that form direct connections 
between individual computers, tightly controlled applications, and 
copyrighted content.  But IP itself is wide open:  specify the IP address of a 
system you’d like your datagram to be delivered to, and dozens of 
computers along the way will voluntarily help get it there.  Most of the 
time, no one asks for payment; no one inspects the contents; no one asks to 
see your signed authorization.  This makes IP not just a universal layer 
sandwiched between more fragmented ones,175 but also a commons layer 
sandwiched between more private ones. 
It was an inspired design decision; IP has a lot of nice desiderata for a 
commons.  A Comedic commons should be as large as possible, as easy as 
possible to join, as minimally demanding as possible on its participants, and 
as flexible as possible in the uses to which it can be put.  IP checks every 
one of those boxes.  Not only is it universal in the sense of being widely 
used, it’s also universal in the sense of being able to run on any kind of 
network.176  It’s also a remarkably simple protocol; all it does is move 
datagrams from point A to point B.177  That makes it easier to implement 
and reduces the need for explicit coordination, both factors that make it 
easier to participate in the IP commons.178  Because IP’s simplicity also 
precludes specialization for particular uses, it’s suitable for almost every 
use.179  It can be a jack of all trades by being a master of none.180  The IP 
Internet is thus both easy for private infrastructure owners to join and easy 
for them to use profitably once they’ve joined. 
This leaves, however, the problem of strategic behavior identified by 
Smith.  That the Internet has a billion users is a sign of success, but that it 
has hundreds of millions of computers is a sign of challenge—that’s a 
massive amount of resources to be devoting to the Internet semicommons.  
Every use of the IP commons imposes very real costs on the private 
infrastructure beneath it, and the natural question is why those costs don’t 
 
 175. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 67–71 (discussing “hourglass architecture” of IP). 
 176. See D. WAITZMAN, RFC 1149, A STANDARD FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF IP 
DATAGRAMS ON AVIAN CARRIERS (1990), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1149 (explaining how 
to implement IP using carrier pigeons). 
 177. See POST, supra note 1, at 82–89 (discussing the simplicity of IP). 
 178. See M. MITCHELL WALDROP, THE DREAM MACHINE:  J.C.R. LICKLIDER AND THE 
REVOLUTION THAT MADE COMPUTING PERSONAL 379–80 (2001) (discussing how IP’s 
simplicity made it easier to connect networks and aided its adoption). 
 179. See David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network, J. HYPERLINKED ORG., June 1997, 
http://www.hyperorg.com/misc/stupidnet.html (“The Stupid Network would let you send 
mixed data types at will . . . .  You would not have to ask your Stupid Network provider for 
any special network modifications . . . .  A rudimentary form of the Stupid Network—the 
Internet—is here today.”). 
 180. See J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277, 278 (1984). 
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overwhelm it.  Routers can become overwhelmed with heavy traffic and 
drop packets; network links can become saturated; servers can crash. 
This isn’t merely a theoretical concern.  Strategic behavior is everywhere 
in the Internet semicommons.  Network backbone operators routinely route 
packets in ways designed to dump as much of the cost as possible on each 
other.181  Virus, worm, and malware authors use the commons to deliver 
their malicious software, hijack users’ private computers, and send out 
spam—which in turn puts costs on private mail servers and actually 
degrades the content commons by polluting it with unwanted, distracting 
messages.182  We also see the wasteful precautionary costs identified by 
Smith:  spam filters,183 CAPTCHAs,184 firewalls,185 and so on are the 
Internet equivalents of farmers sitting out in the rain watching to see where 
the sheep are driven. 
This is all rather discouraging, but, as Galileo apocryphally said, eppur si 
muove.186  The Internet does work, fortunes are made on it, and millions of 
afternoons are enjoyably frittered away reading Twilight fan fiction.  The 
benefits from combining private and common uses online must outweigh 
the costs, notwithstanding all of these abuses, or the Internet would not 
exist. 
Layering is one reason that the costs of strategic behavior and fencing are 
manageable.  IP’s simplicity creates a kind of forced sharing of 
 
 181. For example, network A will hand off packets destined for network B’s users as 
soon as possible, so that network B does the bulk of the work to deliver them. See JONATHAN 
E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:  AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 42–44 (2005). 
 182. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 36–51.  Of course, we might classify these content-
level costs as burdens on the private resources of users’ attention, but saying that this is a 
cost imposed on the commons, even if less descriptively precise, is clearer in terms of 
pinpointing the problem. 
 183. See David Pogue, On the Job, a Spam Fighter Is Learning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2006, at C1 (describing the Spam Cube, a home device to filter spam).  The Spam Cube, like 
other spam-fighting technologies, is costly in two different ways.  It costs $150, and along 
with the spam it catches, it also blocks legitimate emails. Id. 
 184. See ReCAPTCHA, What Is a CAPTCHA?, http://recaptcha.net/captcha.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (“A CAPTCHA is a program that can generate and grade tests that 
humans can pass but current computer programs cannot.”).  But CAPTCHAs are costly, too. 
See BaltTech, Towson U., National Federation of the Blind Re-Invent CAPTCHA, 
http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/technology/2009/11/towson_u_national_federation_o.html 
(Nov. 18, 2009, 8:18 EST) (quoting computer science professor Jonathan Lazar as saying, 
“[b]asically, computer viruses are twice as successful as blind people on the old captchas.”). 
 185. See WILLIAM R. CHESWICK ET AL., FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY:  REPELLING 
THE WILY HACKER, at xviii (2d ed. 2003) (defining “firewall gateway” as a dedicated 
computer that is the only one on a network to communicate with the outside world); id. at 
173–96 (describing how firewalls can provide specialized security).  It’s costly to add a 
dedicated computer to a network for no other purpose than security—to say nothing of the 
expense of configuring and monitoring it, or buying books like Firewalls and Internet 
Security. 
 186. “And yet it moves.” STEPHEN HAWKING, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS:  THE GREAT 
WORKS OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY 393 (2002) (quoting Galileo Galilei).  “[M]ost 
historians regard the story as a myth.” Id. 
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infrastructure for users.  A former housemate used to saturate our Internet 
connection running a peer-to-peer Gnutella node.  It brought my Web 
surfing to a crawl—but it also brought his Web surfing to a crawl.  There 
was no way for him to reach down further in the protocol stack and 
prioritize his physical computer over mine.  It wasn’t full internalization of 
the costs he was creating for the rest of us—but it was enough to convince 
him to moderate his file sharing once he figured out the connection. 
Layering also has salutary boundary-setting effects.187  Because the IP 
layer hides those beneath it, it functions like scattering in preventing 
commons users from strategically targeting specific private pieces of 
infrastructure.  It’s impossible to know with certainty the path that a packet 
will follow, and if one link fails under overload, the packets will flow along 
another route.  You can graze your traffic across particular networks, but 
you can’t easily park all of it in one spot.  Conversely, John Gilmore’s quip 
that “[t]he Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it”188 
captures the point that it’s difficult to impinge on commons uses by 
targeting specific pieces of the private infrastructure.  Take out one node 
and the Internet’s overall flows will be largely unaffected. 
Looking upwards in the protocol stack rather than down, as long as my 
ISP and other infrastructure providers implement IP without violating its 
layering abstractions—that is, as long as they don’t “look inside” the IP 
packets—they have almost no choice but to provide a “neutral” network.189  
Layering becomes an architectural constraint that prevents them from 
selectively choosing to block, alter, or slow my communications.  That 
limits the power of these private owners to engage in self-interested 
bargaining with commons users; they can’t go to Google and demand a 
premium for allowing its traffic to pass, or slow down all video content, or 
otherwise start tinkering with commons uses.190 
B.  User-Generated Content Sites 
Next, consider a large and important category of Internet activity:  UGC 
sites.  All of these sites face the Internet’s semicommons problem in 
miniature.  They typically run on private infrastructure supplied by a single 
entity, but anyone in the world can view and contribute to them.191  Some 
 
 187. Solum & Chung, supra note 173, discuss at length the policy virtues of respecting 
boundaries between layers. 
 188. Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, 
at D4. 
 189. Solum & Chung, supra note 173, at 829–31, 936–42. 
 190. This is not to enter the debates on network neutrality as a matter of policy.  My point 
is merely that layering as a form of boundary-setting limits certain forms of self-interested 
behavior by private owners; evaluating whether this is a good thing or a bad thing would 
require more analysis than can fit in this margin. 
 191. This is another layered system, but note that the private/common division is different 
than the one discussed in the previous section.  Here, the system is held in common at the 
content layer, but is essentially private at every lower layer. 
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are tiny, like my blog—laboratorium.net—which runs on a server operated 
by a group of my friends and has a few comments per day.192  Others are 
gigantic, like YouTube, which runs on a massive Google server farm and 
serves up over a billion video views daily.193 
Once more, we wouldn’t observe the semicommons form unless it were 
worthwhile.  If the juxtaposition of private and common uses weren’t 
creating value, then either the private owners of the servers would turn them 
off or the common users would stop participating.194  In view of Smith’s 
analysis of semicommons incentives, we should therefore ask how these 
sites produce value and how they keep costs under control. 
The first answer is that on the Web, normal commons use can often be a 
source of value for server owners rather than a net cost.  Consider my blog, 
for which I pay about $250 a year.  Each pageview and comment costs me 
something, true, but it gives me more in return.  By allowing readers to 
access my blog, I spread my ideas to a larger audience.  By allowing 
comments, I learn from them.  Even server owners motivated only by 
money can reap value from free commons use.  The secret, as the first 
commercial bloggers discovered, is advertising.195  More users mean more 
ad revenue, so that users are like pooping sheep:  well worth the bother.196 
A site that is free to its users can take advantage of powerful Comedic 
effects.  Any nonzero price requires some form of signup, login, and billing; 
in addition to being costly to implement, these exclusion mechanisms are 
 
 192. The Laboratorium, http://laboratorium.net/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 193. See Posting of Chad Hurley to YouTube Blog, http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/
2009/10/y000000000utube.html (Oct. 9, 2009). 
 194. In this respect, these particular Internet semicommons are more susceptible to 
Demsetzian explanations than many offline property systems and legal regimes, where the 
problem of collective action looms larger. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PROC. 347 (1967) (describing evolution of property 
rights as efficient response when value from more intensive use increases).  Scholars, 
however, have raised difficult questions about the mechanism by which this evolution would 
take place. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S425–33 (2002) (noting ambiguity between optimistic Demsetzian 
story of the evolution of efficient property regimes and pessimistic story about selfish 
interest groups capturing value for themselves).  A UGC site, however, as a resource, doesn’t 
preexist the semicommons form (so that its users can hardly be accused of appropriating a 
commons for their exclusive use), and its users make individual voluntary decisions to take 
part when the rewards outweigh the costs (thus providing a straightforward mechanism for 
the collective decision to use a particular governance regime).  This isn’t to say that UGC 
sites are free of interest-group dynamics, or that they don’t face collective action dilemmas, 
only that their initial development of a property system may pose less of a puzzle than the 
development of property systems in purely tangible online resources. 
 195. See ROSENBERG, supra note 106, at 178–85. 
 196. Sometimes, as with Twitter, the ad revenue isn’t there yet (and may not ever be, if 
the skeptics are to be believed), but the prospect of monetizing the eyeballs justifies the up-
front expenses of building the community. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 896, 902, 921–22 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (basing a holding of vicarious copyright 
infringement on the argument that although Napster had no present revenue, a larger user 
base would give it greater future revenue potential), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 
1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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surprisingly strong psychological impediments to participation.197  That 
means a huge, discontinuous jump in usage when access is truly open.  On a 
site where users interact with each other in creative ways, this spike in 
usage has powerful feedback effects.  My commenters don’t just respond to 
me; they also riff on each others’ thoughts.  It is, in short, the Comedic 
story all over again:  creating a community of sharers produces value for 
everyone involved. 
The second piece of the puzzle is that the server owner doesn’t disappear 
from the picture entirely.  She retains residual exclusionary power.198  She 
may not exercise it ex ante, at least in the first instance.  But she can and 
regularly does exercise it ex post, to target specific instances of abuse.  If 
YouTube users flag an inappropriate video, YouTube will yank it.199  If I 
see a spam comment on my blog, I delete it.  If the abuses are flagrant 
enough, the user is likely to be kicked off the site entirely—and eventually, 
to be blocked at the IP address level.200 
In other words, YouTube and I are paying the monitoring costs to watch 
what commons users do on our private pieces of the Web.  We’re using 
governance to control behavior and self-help exclusion to enforce our 
decisions.  The openness of our sites creates a classically Tragic scenario; 
we use our platform power to deter misuse.201  We’re willing to pay these 
costs because the overall benefits to us of common usage are larger still. 
 
 197. Cf. Anderson, supra note 154, at 146. 
 198. Lest this seem unremarkable, keep in mind that it would be nearly inconceivable for 
an Internet backbone provider to decide sua sponte that it needed to block traffic from a 
particular IP address, and that when Comcast started blocking particular traffic, it drew an 
FCC investigation and injunctive relief. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge 
Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 
13,028 (2008). 
 199. See Google Help, YouTube Glossary:  Flag as Inappropriate, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=95403 (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2010). 
 200. See, e.g., Wikipedia:  Blocking IP Addresses, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Blocking_IP_addresses (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 201. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 495, 
501–06 (1997) (discussing role played by amateur “sysops” of online forums, newsgroups, 
and bulletin boards in fostering community).  Zittrain’s message in 1997 was pessimistic; he 
saw the sysop as a dying breed presiding over fragile communities.  The Future of the 
Internet is far more optimistic about the potential of bottom-up collaboration and altruistic 
community creation in creating a healthy online society.  One possible difference between 
then and now, I would submit, is that the benefits of linking these communities together on 
the Internet—putting the “commons” in “semicommons”—are much clearer today.  
Zittrain’s invocation of the “sysop” also leads us off into the world of bulletin-board systems 
(or “BBSes”).  Time and space constraints don’t permit me to discuss them in detail as an 
additional example of an online organizational form.  Their basic model, however—privately 
owned servers, connected to the telephone network, accessible to anyone who wished to dial 
in via modem—fits the basic semicommons pattern described in this essay, and their history 
also illustrates the applicability of Smith’s model.  For more on BBSes, see generally BBS:  
THE DOCUMENTARY (Bovine Ignition Systems 2005); Textfiles.com, History, 
http://www.textfiles.com/history/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
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The fact that we have this residual platform-based power and are willing 
to use it creates its own countervailing dangers of strategic behavior.  I 
could delete comments from people who disagree with me.  YouTube could 
make it impossible for users to get their videos off the site.  These are 
private uses that impose costs on the common uses, and they’re well studied 
in the literature (if not usually in these terms).202  Abating these costs is 
itself a question in institution design.  But note that within the 
semicommons framework we can still describe the problem as overall cost 
minimization across a number of different forms of strategic behavior and 
strategic behavior prevention. 
A third critical point about these sites is that their success depends on 
their users.  A coherent and motivated user can collectively exercise 
governance to prevent abuse.  Some users guard the private infrastructure 
from commons overuse.  Craigslist knows which posts are spam because its 
users tell it.203  Other users defend the commons from its own enemies.  
Wikipedia’s first line of defense against lies and propaganda is eagle-eyed 
users who look for self-interested or bad-faith edits and undo them.204  A 
strong user community can even defend the commons from the private 
infrastructure owner, as Facebook discovered when it tried to introduce 
privacy-invading advertising technologies.205 
Scale matters in this story.  The Tragic story reminds us that smaller 
groups will be better at self-monitoring and enforcement.  And that’s 
exactly what we see on the Internet, after a fashion. “The Internet” as a 
whole doesn’t have a generic “flag this content for removal” button.  
Instead, the pruning and weeding that help UGC sites flourish take place on 
those sites.  The division of the Web into distinct “sites” makes it easier for 
close-knit communities to form. 
These local communities, in turn, are coupled to each other in important 
ways.206  Individual blogs are connected to each in a network of linking, 
 
 202. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing 
censorship powers of platform owners); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1137, 1192–95 (2009) (discussing platform lock-in).  There’s also the larger question 
of the proper division of value between private owner and commons users.  One could argue 
that the platform owner who becomes rich off of user contributions is engaged in a form of 
digital exploitation. See, e.g., Søren Mørk Petersen, Loser Generated Content:  From 
Participation to Exploitation, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.uic.edu/htbin/
cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2141/1948.  As this is a normative question, not 
an analytic one, I put it aside for the time being. 
 203. Craigslist, Flags and Community Moderation, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/
flags_and_community_moderation (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 204. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 131–42 (discussing Wikipedia). 
 205. Louise Story & Brad Stone, Facebook Retreats on Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2007, at C1. 
 206. See generally DAVID WEINBERGER, SMALL PIECES LOOSELY JOINED:  HOW THE WEB 
SHOWS US WHO WE REALLY ARE (2002) (describing the Internet’s success in terms of this 
loose coupling of small components in multiple domains). 
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quotation, and conversation.207  YouTube took off because it offered users 
the trivially easy capacity to embed videos in other Web pages—that is, to 
bridge the YouTube community and others.208  This is a modular structure:  
tight community coupling within a site and looser coupling across sites.209  
This arrangement makes each site’s Tragic internal governance problem 
more manageable while also facilitating Comedic conversations across 
sites.210 
The same is also true within large sites.  Wikipedia has many 
“WikiProjects”:  groups of pages on a similar topic.211  They tend to have 
common groups of editors who focus on them.  Bingo:  a small and close-
knit community, loosely coupled to others within Wikipedia.  Similarly, 
social network sites divide the world into small networks centered around 
every user, forming overlapping communities.  These Internet institutions 
bridge the optimal scales for private and common uses. 
C.  Usenet and Boundary-Setting 
Semicommons theory explains the Internet’s failures as well as its 
successes.  Only those online institutions that can cost-effectively deter 
strategic behavior at the interface between private and common will prosper 
at the planetary scale of the Internet.  Those that can’t will stagnate rather 
than grow—or even collapse entirely under the strain of a worldwide 
semicommons. 
As an example of a failed online semicommons, consider Usenet, a 
distributed set of message boards.212   Its use of interconnected servers to 
 
 207. See ROSENBERG, supra note 106, at 205–06; Posting of James Grimmelmann to 
LawMeme, http://lawmeme.research.yale.edu/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=1155 
(June 18, 2003, 4:03 EDT). 
 208. See Posting of Deepak Thomas and Vineet Buch to Startup Review, 
http://www.startup-review.com/blog/youtube-case-study-widget-marketing-comes-of-age.php 
(Mar. 18, 2007). 
 209. See SIMON, supra note 168, at 197–205 (describing common pattern of tightly 
coupled modules themselves loosely coupled to each other); Mark S. Granovetter, The 
Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973) (describing power of loose links to bridge 
different social groups). 
 210. This point may have implications for Zittrain’s goal of stopping malware through 
“suasion” and “experimentation.” ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 173.  Zittrain’s discussion of 
the challenges and goals of the StopBadware project clearly recognizes the dangers of both 
too much and not enough private control, at multiple scales. Id. at 168–73.  Sites 
experimenting with security policies in an informed way are private and Tragic.  Internet-
wide monitoring and information-sharing are common and Comedic. See id.  
 211. See Wikipedia:  WikiProject, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiProject (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2010) (“A WikiProject is a collection of pages devoted to the management of a 
specific topic or family of topics within Wikipedia; and, simultaneously, a group of editors 
who use those pages to collaborate on encyclopedic work.”). 
 212. On the technology and operation of Usenet (sometimes also written as “USENET”), 
see generally JENNY A. FRISTUP, USENET:  NETNEWS FOR EVERYONE (1994); MARK 
HARRISON, THE USENET HANDBOOK:  A USER’S GUIDE TO NETNEWS (1995); ED KROL, THE 
WHOLE INTERNET:  USER’S GUIDE & CATALOG (2d ed. 1994); TIM O’REILLY & GRACE 
TODINO, MANAGING UUCP AND USENET (10th ed. 1992); and BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, THE 
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create shared worldwide “newsgroups” made it a thriving semicommons 
through the 1980s.213   But this same structure couldn’t cope with the 
abuses caused by the Internet’s exponential takeoff in the 1990s.214  A 
comparison of Usenet with e-mail and UGC sites shows that they did a 
better job of boundary-setting.215  Semicommons theory explains how 
different design choices can help one online institution succeed where 
another fails. 
1.  How Usenet Works 
Individual Usenet users post and read messages on a local server on 
which they have an account; these servers then exchange new messages 
 
USENET BOOK:  FINDING, USING, AND SURVIVING NEWSGROUPS ON THE INTERNET (1994).  
For discussion of its culture and sociology, see generally MICHAEL HAUBEN & RHONDA 
HAUBEN, NETIZENS:  ON THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF USENET AND THE INTERNET (1997); 
HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:  HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER 117–31 (1993); and CLAY SHIRKY, VOICES FROM THE NET 80–89 (1995).  Within 
the law review literature, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net:  
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 821–31 (2003); Paul K. 
Ohm, On Regulating the Internet:  Usenet, a Case Study, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1941 (1999); 
David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital:  Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and 
Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 163 n.54; and Charles D. Siegal, 
Rule Formation in Non-hierarchical Systems, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 173, 181–83, 
190–99 (1997). See also Eric Schlachter, War of the Cancelbots!, 
http://eric_goldman.tripod.com/articles/cancelbotarticle.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).  
Usenet has made sporadic appearances in the case reports.  Highlights with significant 
factual discussion of Usenet include Arista Records LLC v. USENET.com, Inc., 633 F. 
Supp. 2d 124, 129–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053–
54 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 
834–35 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); and Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 n.4, 1367–68 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  Purists 
may insist that “Usenet” refers only to one particular set of newsgroups, and that “Network 
News” is the correct umbrella term that also includes local newsgroups and even a few 
alternative hierarchies. See, e.g., KROL, supra, at 151–57.  In practice, though, users often 
also referred to these other hierarchies as “Usenet.” See id. at 452.  Similarly, one could 
technically distinguish between the higher-level protocol governing Usenet’s messages and 
newsgroups, see M. HORTON & R. ADAMS, RFC 1036 STANDARD FOR INTERCHANGE OF 
USENET MESSAGES (1987), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1036 [hereinafter RFC 1036], and 
the lower-level protocols governing how those messages are transferred from one computer 
to another. See MARK R. HORTON, RFC 976, UUCP MAIL INTERCHANGE FORMAT STANDARD 
(1986), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc976; BRIAN KANTOR & PHIL LAPSLEY, RFC 977, 
NETWORK NEWS TRANSFER PROTOCOL (1986), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1036.  But in 
practice, the same social conventions causing users and administrators to standardize on the 
one protocol also led them to standardize on the other.  As Paul Ohm puts it, “Just as you can 
get from downtown to Westwood without a car, you can communicate via Usenet without 
NNTP [Network News Transfer Protocol].  But most people would not take this trip without 
a car, just as most people do not use USENET except over NNTP.” Ohm, supra, 1949–50 
n.28 (citing RFC 1036, supra, § 4). 
 213. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 214. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 215. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
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with each other via a peer-to-peer protocol.216  Each server talks only to a 
few others, but most Usenet servers are linked together so that any given 
message will eventually be propagated to all servers in the network.217 
This technical structure coexists with Usenet’s semantic structure:  a 
hierarchy of topical “newsgroups.”218  That hierarchy, established in 1987 
in a coordinated event known as the “Great Renaming,” divides the Usenet 
universe into “newsgroups” such as soc.culture.welsh (on Welsh culture) 
and sci.math (on mathematics).219  Individual messages are typically posted 
to a single newsgroup, but replicated across the whole network of 
servers.220  The administrators of individual servers decide which 
newsgroups to carry on their servers.221 
Usenet also sported a higher level of governance (of the sort detailed by 
Ostrom)222 in its institutions for collective decision making about which 
newsgroups to support.223  A centralized board coordinated the process:  a 
proposed new newsgroup (or proposed deletion of an old one) would be 
publicly announced, discussed, and put to a vote.  The certified results of 
this process were generally accepted as legitimate by server operators:  a 
proposed newsgroup that won its vote would typically be added by enough 
servers that it would achieve critical density in the network and connect 
those users who wanted to join it.224 
Once again, the semicommons structure is evident.  Each server is a 
private use; each newsgroup is a common use.  The two are inextricably 
intertwined.  The worldwide network of servers gives each newsgroup a 
 
 216. This exchange originally took place through direct telephone-line connections 
between Usenet servers; as the Internet became more widely available, the exchanges 
gradually switched over to using the Internet for their transport. See HAUBEN & HAUBEN, 
supra note 212, 39–40, 44; RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 120–21. 
 217. See RFC 1036, supra note 212, § 5 (describing algorithm for propagation of Usenet 
messages through network). 
 218. See KROL, supra note 212, at 153–54. 
 219. See Henry Edward Hardy, The History of the Net (Sept. 20, 1993) (unpublished 
master’s thesis, Grand Valley State University), available at http://w2.eff.org/Net_culture/
net.history.txt.  On the topical nature of particular newsgroups, see generally the archive of 
Usenet Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) files at www.faqs.org, which are organized by 
newsgroup. 
 220. See Ohm, supra note 212, at 1945–47 (describing posting to newsgroups); id. at 
1949–50 (describing replication).  On server operation, see generally O’REILLY & TODINO, 
supra note 212. 
 221. See KROL, supra note 212, at 157 (“Last, we must deal with (how can I write this 
delicately?) censorship.  Some administrators decide that some groups (especially in the alt 
category) are not for consumption by the server’s clientele.  So they choose not to carry 
them.”).  Since, by 2002, Usenet carried 1000 gigabytes of data per day, see Froomkin, 
supra note 212, at 822, some prioritization of which groups to carry was a technical 
necessity. See KROL, supra note 212, at 156 (“A server administrator may choose not to 
accept a certain group because it is very active and eats up too much disk space.”). 
 222. OSTROM, supra note 62, at 101–02 (discussing importance of “nested enterprises”). 
 223. See Froomkin, supra note 212, at 823–24. 
 224. Id. at 824–25. 
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global reach,225 but each server remains locally owned and operated.  By 
2002, Usenet was carrying over 1000 gigabytes of messages a day.226  
That’s both a remarkable volume of shared content and a tremendous 
technical burden on each server. 
Through the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, Usenet was a highly 
successful semicommons, reaching more than 2.5 million people by 
1992.227  Both boundary-setting devices—between servers and between 
newsgroups—played a role.  Dividing Usenet across servers (rather than 
centralizing it) made it technically feasible and enabled it to grow by 
accretion as individual server operators connected and joined the 
semicommons.228  Meanwhile, dividing Usenet into newsgroups supported 
the formation of smaller communities capable of exercising good internal 
governance.  Strong social norms of netiquette discouraged off-topic posts, 
for example:  a post about football in sci.math would draw a scolding.229  
The norms of sci.math and the norms of soc.culture.welsh could be 
different, making both stronger. 
2.  How Usenet Failed 
But past performance is no guarantee of future results, and Usenet didn’t 
deal well with the Internet’s massive surge in popularity during the 1990s.  
As the number of new Internet users increased exponentially year after year, 
so did the technical and social strains on the Usenet semicommons.230  The 
most visible form of abuse was spam:  messages (usually, but not 
exclusively, commercial) posted to thousands of newsgroups at once.  It 
placed enormous technical burdens on the private infrastructure and 
substantially degraded the readability of the common newsgroups.231  Both 
 
 225. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 130 (“Usenet is a place for conversation or 
publication, like a giant coffeehouse with a thousand rooms; it is also a worldwide digital 
version of the Speaker’s Corner in London’s Hyde Park, an unedited collection of letters to 
the editor, a floating flea market, a huge vanity publisher, and a coalition of every odd 
special-interest group in the world.”). 
 226. Froomkin, supra note 212, at 822. 
 227. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 120.  The years of publication of the books on 
Usenet cited in footnote 212 are telling:  1992, 1993, 1994, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1995, and 
1997. See supra note 212. 
 228. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 119 (“All you had to do to join Usenet was to 
obtain the free software, find a site to feed you News and take your postings, and you were 
in action.”). 
 229. See S. HAMBRIDGE, RFC 1855, NETIQUETTE GUIDELINES (1995), http://tools.ietf.org/
html/rfc1855. 
 230. In Internet folklore, at least, the tide turned in 1993, as commercial services like 
Delphi and AOL began offering their millions of subscribers access to Usenet newsgroups, 
an event known as the “Eternal September”—a never-ending stream of new users as 
unfamiliar with Usenet’s norms as the annual crop of college first-years had been. See 
WENDY M. GROSSMAN, NET.WARS 9–11 (1997). 
 231. See Froomkin, supra note 212, at 825–29. 
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Usenet’s property boundaries and its institutions proved incapable of 
dealing with this influx. 
Architecturally, Usenet got the property boundaries wrong.  Each 
meaningful community—a newsgroup—was split across many pieces of 
private infrastructure—servers—and vice-versa.  This form of scattering 
inhibited opportunism by censorious private server operators:  other servers 
could exchange a message even if one server deleted it,232 and its own users 
could switch Usenet providers.233  But it also meant that neither private 
server operators nor commons newsgroup communities were in a position 
to deal effectively with spam.  The private infrastructure owners couldn’t 
individually take effective action against heavily cross-posted spam and 
garbage; they each had to monitor all of Usenet, and a message deleted on 
one server would still crop up on the others. 
Meanwhile, the community of readers of a particular newsgroup being 
overrun also had no good tools to stop the flood.  Social norms collapsed 
under the first sustained assault from outsiders.  In 1994, a pair of 
immigration lawyers advertised their services on over 6000 newsgroups.234  
The outcry was remarkable:  not just online condemnation, but also self-
help denial-of-service e-mail attacks, threats to the lawyers’ ISP, and “huge 
numbers of magazine[] subscriptions in [the lawyers’] names.”235  Legal 
scholars have discussed the remarkable vehemence of this response,236 but 
it’s more a sign of weakness than of strength.  Effective social norms don’t 
require such extensive enforcement, precisely because they’re effective.  
The immigration lawyers were outsiders to the newsgroup communities 
they spammed, afraid of no threats the newsgroups could wield.237 
In any event, later events established that social norms were essentially 
ineffective against spam.  Other spammers soon followed, in large 
numbers.238  The green-card lottery spam was the proof of concept—the 
lawyers behind it even published a book of advice for other would-be 
 
 232. See Giganews, Usenet Interview with John Gilmore, http://www.giganews.com/
usenet-history/gilmore.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (“For example, the quote I seem to 
be most famous for, ‘The net treats censorship as damage and routes around it’, came 
directly out of my Usenet experience.  I was actually talking about the Usenet when I first 
said it.  And that’s how the Usenet works—if you have three news feeds coming in, and one 
of those feeds censors the material it handles, the censored info automatically comes in from 
the other two.”). 
 233. See KROL, supra note 212, at 132 (“If you are offended [by your server 
administrator’s refusal to carry a newsgroup], you have two choices:  find another server or 
beat up on your administrator.”). 
 234. Siegal, supra note 212, at 192. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Froomkin, supra note 212, at 827–28 (“[M]ass self-defense . . . .”); Siegal, supra 
note 212, at 192–93 (“[E]xtreme self-help . . . .”). 
 237. See Siegal, supra note 212, at 193 (“Moreover, Canter and Seigel, unbowed by their 
role as outcasts on the Internet, published a book telling other would be cyber-entrepreneurs 
how to profit by following their example . . . .”). 
 238. See id. (“[S]pamming is common . . . .”). 
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Usenet spammers, claiming they’d made over $100,000 at it.239  Efforts at 
educating new users also proved futile.240  Without clear boundaries to 
exclude outsiders and effective enforcement mechanisms, norm-based self-
governance runs into exactly the barriers described by Ostrom. 
In the late 1990s, as these failures were becoming obvious, Usenet 
citizens (and a few legal scholars241) celebrated instead the possibility of 
technical self-defense.  One older technique was moderation:  as on a 
moderated listserv, messages would be sent to a newsgroup administrator, 
and only posted after he or she approved them.242  While effective in 
dealing with spam, moderation imposes substantial costs on the Comedic 
potential of a group:  it slows down messages as they wait for the 
moderator’s approval, inhibiting conversation;243 it depends on the 
volunteer labor of a moderator willing to perform this round-the-clock 
job;244 and it allows the moderator to behave opportunistically, shaping or 
censoring the flow of dialogue.245  Most Usenet groups were 
unmoderated,246 and it’s not hard to think of a reason.  Moderation doesn’t 
scale. 
Newer techniques of technological self-defense fared little better.  
Consider the killfile:  a personal list of users whose messages you don’t 
want to see.247  Your personal newsreading program hides those messages; 
they remain on the server for others to read.248  The killfile sounds like a 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (“But these guidelines obviously do not deter those who seek either financial gain 
or perverse pleasure from spamming.”). 
 241. See Ohm, supra note 212, at 1941 (“[S]till too early for a legislature to 
intervene . . . .”); Siegal, supra note 212, at 193–95. 
 242. See FRISTUP, supra note 212, at 25; Ohm, supra note 212, at 1976–77. 
 243. See Internet FAQ Archives, Moderated Newsgroups FAQ, http://www.faqs.org/
faqs/usenet/moderated-ng-faq/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (“In general, hand-moderated 
newsgroups often have some unavoidable delay . . . .”). 
 244. See id. (“[A] typical setup for doing moderation would include . . . several hours of 
spare time per week for at least a year . . . .”). 
 245. See id. (“The discussion of differences between moderation and censorship has been 
erupting several times a year in news.groups for about 15 years.”). 
 246. See id. (noting a total of about 300 moderated Usenet newsgroups); cf. Froomkin, 
supra note 212, at 822 (counting “thousands” of newsgroups overall). 
 247. PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 212, at 193 (“The (Unfortunately Necessary) Art of the 
Kill File . . . .  The proper remedy for all the above-mentioned forms of net.abuse is the kill 
file.”).  Items could also be killed based on other criteria, such as the use of a particular 
phrase. See KROL, supra note 212, at 166–69 (explaining use of keyword-based tagging and 
killing to help newsgroup readers quickly browse topics).  But the term “kill file” is most 
colorfully used to describe user-based filtering. See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE NEW HACKER’S 
DICTIONARY 269 (3d ed. 1996) (“Thus to add a person (or subject) to one’s kill file is to 
arrange for that person to be ignored by one’s newsreader in future.  By extension, it may be 
used for a decision to ignore the person or subject in other media.”). 
 248. See Internet FAQ Archivers, rn KILL file FAQ § 1, http://www.faqs.org/faqs/
killfile-faq/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (noting in passing that there is a killfile “for each 
user”).  The killfile works a bit like a personal filter that sends all messages from your crazy 
cousin straight to an archive folder.  Compare the nearly identical interfaces for “Rules” 
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perfectly speech-friendly system:  the killfiler’s freedom not to read is 
respected, and so is the killfilee’s freedom to speak and other users’ 
freedom to hear from her.249  And it does work well enough in small 
communities for dealing with specific annoying users:  a kind of virtual 
silent treatment.250  But it fails in a larger commons.   Most of the 
spammers and trolls are new users you’ve never heard of (and will never 
hear from again).251  Nor does killfiling reduce the technical burdens felt by 
server operators—the servers still need to carry the messages, even though 
users ignore them. 
Cancelbots failed, too.  They take their name from the fact that a Usenet 
post author can send a follow-up message to “cancel” her original post, 
thereby deleting it.252  These messages are easily forged, leading to a self-
help mechanism for dealing with spam and abuse:  just forge a cancel 
message for the offending post.253  As the spam problem grew, vigilante 
Usenet users started automating the cancels, using programs called 
“cancelbots.”254  In practice, though, cancelbots didn’t so much end the 
Usenet spam wars as escalate them.255  Spammers vied to send out ads 
faster than the vigilantes could cancel them; this competition was a wasteful 
arms race.256  Worse, spammers themselves could use cancels against their 
 
(including killing, marking as read, and sorting messages) in Unison (a newsreader) and 
Mail.app (an e-mail client) for Mac OS X. 
 249. See SHIRKY, supra note 212, at 82 (“Kill files perfectly illustrate the burden placed 
on the reader on Usenet where freedom of speech is as absolute as its gets anywhere.  For all 
intents and purposes, anyone can say anything to anyone.  If a certain kind of speech causes 
upset, it is usually up to the reader not to read posts about those subjects or mail from those 
people.”). 
 250. This observation is based on the personal experience of the author.  I would rather 
not, for reasons that should be obvious, name the specific newsgroups and mailing lists on 
which I have resorted to using a killfile. 
 251. See, e.g., James “Kibo” Parry, Killfiles and You, http://www.kibo.com/kibokill/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (providing detailed suggestions for efficient use of a killfile).  Note 
the assumption that filtering out specific unwanted users will not suffice to make a 
newsgroup readable; more detailed filtering is required. 
 252. See Siegal, supra note 212, at 194; RFC 1036, supra note 212, § 3.1; Internet FAQ 
Archives, Cancel Messages:  Frequently Asked Questions, Part 2/4 (v1.75), 
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/usenet/cancel-faq/part2/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) [hereinafter 
Cancel FAQ, Part 2/4]. 
 253. See Siegal, supra note 212, at 194; Internet FAQ Archives, Cancel Messages: 
Frequently Asked Questions, Part 1/4 (v1.75), at I–II, http://www.faqs.org/faqs/usenet/
cancel-faq/part1/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (discussing “third-party” cancels, including 
“forged” cancels). 
 254. Cancel FAQ, Part 2/4, supra note 252, at IV.C. (“A cancelbot is a program that 
searches for messages matching a certain pattern and sends out cancels for them; it’s 
basically an automated cancel program, run by a human operator.”). 
 255. See GROSSMAN, supra note 230, at 75–78 (discussing technical back-and-forth 
between message posters and message cancelers). 
 256. See Froomkin, supra note 212, at 829–31 (discussing “Usenet Death Penalty” in 
which a site considered to be too lax in stopping spam “has every single Usenet post 
originating from it immediately canceled or at least not forwarded.  Thus, every person using 
that ISP loses the ability to post to Usenet regardless of his or her guilt or, in most cases, 
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enemies257 (leading to the use of pseudonymous anti-spam entities like the 
Cancelmoose[tm]).258  Worse still, griefers259 could use cancels against 
completely innocent Usenet posters260—so that many server administrators 
simply ignored cancels entirely.261 
Perhaps some larger institution could have developed coherent 
cancelation policies and consistently applied those policies across Usenet’s 
mishmash of servers and newsgroups.262  But Usenet’s existing institutions 
were too weak and too distrusted to develop and enforce such policies on 
the diverse and dispersed Usenet community.263  Different newsgroups had 
different norms; different server operators had different appetites for 
ongoing governance work.264  It was a classic collective action problem:  
 
innocence”); Cancel FAQ, Part 2/4, supra note 252, at IV.E (“Giving out a cancelbot is like 
handing out loaded guns with no safeties.”). 
 257. See Cancel FAQ, Part 2/4, supra note 252, at V.D (discussing spammers who used 
cancels as an offensive weapon, such as “Krazy Kevin,” who “cancelled many posts on 
news.admin.net-abuse.misc concerning his spams” and “Crusader,” who tried to prevent 
investigation of a neo-Nazi mass email by cancelling Usenet messages discussing it). 
 258. See Post, supra note 212, at 163 n.54, 166 (discussing pseudonymity of 
Cancelmoose[tm]); Internet FAQ Archives, Net Abuse FAQ, § 2.9, http://www.faqs.org/
faqs/net-abuse-faq/part1/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010)) (“Cancelmoose[tm] is, to misquote 
some wise poster, ‘the greatest public servant the net has seen in quite some time.’  Once 
upon a time, the ‘Moose would send out spam-cancels and then post notice anonymously to 
news.admin.policy, news.admin.misc, and alt.current-events.net-abuse.  The ‘Moose stepped 
to the fore on its own initiative, at a time (mid 1994) when spam-cancels were irregular and 
disorganized, and behaved altogether admirably—fair, even-handed, and quick to respond to 
comments and criticism, all without self-aggrandizement or martyrdom. . . . Nobody knows 
who Cancelmoose[tm] really is, and there aren’t even any good rumors.”). 
 259. See Julian Dibbell, Griefer Madness, WIRED, Feb. 2008, at 90, 92 (defining “griefer” 
as “an online version of the spoilsport—someone who takes pleasure in shattering the world 
of play itself”). 
 260. See Cancel FAQ, Part 2/4, supra note 252, at V.D (listing “rogue cancellers of 
various skill, competence, and intelligence”).  Notable examples include Ellisd, who tried on 
moral grounds to cancel all messages posted to alt.sex, and the so-called CancelBunny, 
which tried to cancel posts containing the scriptures of Scientology. Id. 
 261. Froomkin, supra note 212, at 829. 
 262. See id. at 828–31 (discussing attempt by “Internet vigilantes” to coordinate their 
efforts through the news.admin.net-abuse newsgroup and impose collective punishments on 
servers deemed to be excessively spam-friendly and discussing debates over legitimacy and 
existence of consensus to act against particular spammers). 
 263. See id. at 823–25 (discussing difficulty of coordinating process of selecting which 
newsgroups to carry); Hardy, supra note 219 (discussing how dissatisfaction with decisions 
by administrators of “backbone cabal” systems not to carry newsgroups discussing sex or 
drugs, leading to creation of alternative hierarchy for distribution of news and abdication of 
previous coordinators of newsgroup-creation process); Lee S. Bumgarner, The Great 
Renaming FAQ:  Part 4, http://www.linux.it/~md/usenet/gr4.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) 
(discussing near “constitutional crisis” on Usenet, including forged votes, over whether to 
create a newsgroup devoted to discussion of aquaria); Giganews, 1987:  The Great 
Renaming—Page 2, http://www.giganews.com/usenet-history/renaming-2.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2010) (discussing controversy over Great Renaming and suspicion of the 
administrators who pushed it through). 
 264. See Froomkin, supra note 212, at 823 (noting that “backbone cabal” systems carried 
disproportionate share of Usenet traffic); id. at 824–25 (observing that “a large number, 
perhaps a majority, of sites had effectively delegated administration of the newsgroup 
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redesigning Usenet’s technical protocols would have required widespread 
user and server-owner agreement—but that would also have meant giving 
up some of the private control and commons freedom that these groups 
prized about Usenet. 
In the end, Usenet’s distributed openness left it vulnerable to exactly the 
pressures Smith identifies:  griefers used the commons to strategically 
target private users, and spammers used the commons without heeding the 
effects on private infrastructure.265  Usenet itself is not dead.  One can still 
go to Google Groups or Giganews and participate in ongoing conversations 
in groups with strong norms that allowed them to weather the storm.  But it 
has nowhere near the relative importance that it once did to the life of the 
Internet.  ISPs are gradually dropping their support for Usenet 
newsgroups,266 and it seems unlikely that the system will ever meaningfully 
rise again.267 
3.  Why E-mail Succeeded Where Usenet Failed 
This diagnosis—bad boundary-setting—is specific to Usenet.  The entire 
Internet suffers from spam268—any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from a spam vector.269  Spam is the most characteristic 
form of strategic behavior in the Internet semicommons; a commons use 
that imposes serious costs both on commons and private use.270  But other 
applications have managed to cope with the spam problem—because their 
boundaries are drawn in ways that permit more effective monitoring and 
enforcement. 
Contrast Usenet, for example, with the UGC sites described in the 
previous section.  As detailed above, these sites align commons community 
with private server infrastructure, giving them governance and exclusion 
 
creation process to one person” who was willing to “take the time to figure out what is a 
legitimate group . . . and what is a practical joke”). 
 265. See, e.g., Sascha Segan, R.I.P. Usenet, PC MAG.COM, July 31, 2008, 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2326849,00.asp (“[S]ervice providers sensibly 
started to wonder why they should be reserving big chunks of their own disk space for 
pirated movies and repetitive porn.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, N.Y. Attorney General Forces ISPs To Curb Usenet 
Access, CNET NEWS, June 10, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9964895-38.html. 
 267. See Posting of Kevin Poulsen to Epicenter, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/
2009/10/usenet/ (Oct. 7, 2009, 12:34 PST). 
 268. Clay Shirky has written that “[s]ocial software is stuff that gets spammed.” Posting 
of Clay Shirky to Many2Many, http://many.corante.com/archives/2005/02/01/
tags_run_amok.php (Feb. 1, 2005). 
 269. As of this writing, Wikipedia discusses “e-mail spam . . . instant messaging spam, 
Usenet newsgroup spam, Web search engine spam, spam in blogs, wiki spam, online 
classified ads spam, mobile phone messaging spam, Internet forum spam, junk fax 
transmissions, social networking spam, and file sharing network spam.” Spam (electronic), 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spamming (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).  Just about 
anything worth using online is spammed. 
 270. See Chris Kanich et al., Spamalytics:  An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing 
Conversion, 52 COMM. ACM 99 (2009). 
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advantages that newsgroups lacked.271  But a UGC site configured as a 
discussion board behaves—from a user perspective—almost exactly like a 
newsgroup.272  Together with blogs and other similar social software, these 
Web-based discussion boards have taken over many of the community-
forum roles that Usenet newsgroups previously played.  Now that dispersed 
servers are no longer technically necessary—as they were in the days before 
the Internet273—the dedicated website is a superior institutional form from a 
semicommons perspective. 
Or contrast Usenet with e-mail. While e-mail spam is certainly a serious 
and costly problem, e-mail has nonetheless been one of the Internet’s great 
success stories.  This success is all the more remarkable, given that a decade 
and a half ago, e-mail and Usenet looked very similar.274  They were started 
within a few years of each other, and they’re both text-based, Internet-wide 
communications systems that allow users to communicate with each other 
through a peer-to-peer process of message exchange.275  And yet the e-mail 
of 2010 is essential to the Internet as we know it and is used by almost 
everyone; the Usenet of 2010 is an archaic survival used by small groups of 
enthusiasts. 
What happened?  E-mail got its property boundaries right.  Usenet was 
created with the expectation that users throughout the network would share 
the same newsgroups; its design works to coordinate everyone’s 
experiences.276  By contrast, e-mail cares only about delivery:  getting a 
particular message to a particular recipient.277 There are no e-mail 
equivalents to newsgroups—coordinated entities that all users see in a 
substantially identical form.  Each e-mail server is a dedicated piece of 
infrastructure designed to enable incoming and outgoing e-mail for its own 
 
 271. See supra Part IV.B. 
 272. See Usenet, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usenet (last visited Apr. 10, 
2010) (“Usenet . . . is the precursor to the various Internet forums that are widely used 
today . . . .”). 
 273. See Giganews, Usenet Newsgroups History, http://www.giganews.com/usenet-
history/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (describing switch from UUCP to NNTP as 
being designed to take advantage of “cutting-edge networking concepts” including the 
“always-on” Internet).  Without the always-on Internet, unless most users are willing to pay 
long-distance phone charges to connect, they need to have servers located near them. 
 274. Krol, writing in 1994, thought that e-mail and Usenet each deserved a chapter.  
Indeed, he gave the Web roughly the same amount of space he gave to Usenet. KROL, supra 
note 212, at 101–48 (e-mail); id. at 151–87 (Usenet); id. at 287–322 (Web). 
 275. Usenet was born in 1979, WALDROP, supra note 178, at 427–28, modern SMTP-
based e-mail in 1983, id. at 465. 
 276. See, e.g., MARK R. HORTON, RFC 850, STANDARD FOR INTERCHANGE OF USENET 
MESSAGES § 3.4 (1983), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc850 (“This message removes a 
newsgroup with the given name. . . . [T]he newsgroup is removed from every site on the 
network . . . .”). 
 277. See, e.g., RFC 821, supra note 145, § 3.2 (discussing forwarding of message by 
intermediate relays, with no expectation that they will retain copies for themselves or 
transmit to other, unspecified recipients). 
GRIMMELMANN_10_04_29_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/29/2010  11:26 PM 
2010] THE INTERNET IS A SEMICOMMONS 2841 
 
users.278  This difference means that e-mail servers have defensible borders.  
I can install a spam filter without disrupting any e-mail except that to and 
from users on my piece of the network.279  That lets me experiment with 
local anti-spam policies without needing anyone else’s permission or 
cooperation.280  Users, in turn, can choose e-mail providers based on the 
quality of their spam filtering.281 
In a very important sense, e-mail is less ambitious than Usenet.  E-mail 
may be a common protocol open to everyone, and most e-mail servers may 
be “common” in the sense that anyone can send a mail to users on them, but 
e-mail itself is deeply nonpublic.  A great e-mail message can only be 
widely shared through successive forwarding.  Some people who might 
have benefited from it won’t ever be on the cc: lists.  That’s a loss to the 
commons, and it’s a reason that e-mail coexists with all sorts of systems 
designed to offer more community, like mailing lists and the discussion 
boards we’ve already met.  But the price we pay for needing to turn 
elsewhere for a fuller commons is that e-mail actually works. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the scholarly debates over the significance of the Internet, the private-
versus-common dichotomy looms large.  Triumphalists proclaim that the 
Internet creates new forms of collaboration and that the commons is the 
way of the future.  Skeptics respond that the stability and sustainability of 
the Internet depend on private ownership.  These are the Comedic and 
Tragic stories, and they animate scholarly controversies in 
telecommunications, intellectual property, privacy, intermediary regulation, 
virtual worlds, and almost every other corner of Internet law. 
In addition to its analytical virtues in explaining why some Internet 
systems thrive and others fail, semicommons theory also speaks to these 
debates.  It reminds us not to take the seeming schism between “private” 
and “common” too seriously.  The greatest commons the world has ever 
seen is built out of private property; the highest, best, and most profitable 
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use of that property is to create a commons.  Private and common need each 
other, and we need them both on the Internet.  Our task is not to choose 
between them but to find ways to make them work well together.282 
 
 282. Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX:  MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY (2008) (arguing for coexistence of and collaboration between private and common 
forms in the law of intellectual property); Heverly, supra note 141, at 1184–85. 
